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INTRODUCTION 
In Ferguson, a wound bleeds. For 108 days, we have been in a state of 
prolonged and protracted grief. . . . We have had no choice but to cling 
together in hope, faith, love and indomitable determination to capture that 
ever-escaping reality of justice . . . we find ourselves reinjured, continually 
heartbroken, and robbed of even the remote possibility of judicial 
resolution. For 108 days, we have continuously been admonished that we 
should “let the system work,” and wait to see what the results are. The 
results are in. And we still don’t have justice. . . . We, altogether, bound up 
in a system that continues to treat some men better than others. A system 
that preserves some and disregards others. A system that protects the rights 
of some and does not guard the rights of all. And until this system is 
dismantled, until the status quo that deems us less valuable than others is no 
longer acceptable or profitable, we will struggle.2 
                                                   
 2. Dmckesso, The Results Are In: An Open Letter from Protestors on the 
Grand Jury Decision, SCRIBD (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.scribd.com/ 
document/248115932/The-Results-Are-in-Open-Letter-11-24-14 
[https://perma.cc/RTB7-GXPE] (emphasis added). 
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The residents of Ferguson, Missouri may someday seek 
reconciliation. Yet, in the wake of the death of Mike Brown, and in 
the half-year spent waiting for the slow wheels of the criminal system 
to turn, Ferguson did not ask for reconciliation; it sought justice. 
Citizens across the country reeling from the shooting of unarmed 
members of their community have echoed this demand. Cleveland 
demanded justice for the killings of Malissa Williams, Timothy 
Russell, and Tamir Rice;3 Baton Rouge demanded justice for the 
killing of Alton Sterling;4 Minnesota demanded justice for the killing 
of Philando Castile.5 The list, tragically, goes on.6 American 
communities recovering from the wounds of loss of life—particularly 
when those wounds are tinged with the pain of racial animus—want 
justice before reconciliation.7  
                                                   
 3. Daniel McGraw, Cleveland Officer Not Guilty Over Deaths of Two 
People Shot at 137 Times by Police, GUARDIAN (May 23, 2015, 1:45 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/may/23/cleveland-officer-not-guilty-
shot-137-times-police [https://perma.cc/7H2E-PTNA]; Mitch Smith & Ashley 
Southall, Cleveland Officer Acquitted of Manslaughter in 2012 Deaths, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/24/us/michael-brelo-cleveland-
police-officer-acquitted-of-manslaughter-in-2012-deaths.html 
[https://perma.cc/PW8Q-FVHV]; Timothy Williams & Mitch Smith, Cleveland 
Officer Will Not Face Charges in Tamir Rice Shooting Death, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/us/tamir-rice-police-shootiing-
cleveland.html [https://perma.cc/BH55-PX9G]. 
 4. Jason Hanna, No Charges Against Officers in Alton Sterling Death; 
Other Videos are Coming, CNN (Mar. 27, 2018, 6:22 PM), https://www.cnn.com/ 
2018/03/27/us/alton-sterling-investigation/index.html [https://perma.cc/42AD-
9ZTJ]. 
 5. Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted in Killing of Philando Castile, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017). Valerie, Castile’s mother, proclaimed that “[t]he system 
in this country continues to fail black people and will continue to fail us.” Id.   
 6. See Eugene Scott, Police Shootings of Unarmed Black People Have Not 
Ended. But Top-Level Political Conversations About Them Have., WASH. POST (Mar. 
22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/03/22/ 
police-shootings-of-unarmed-black-people-have-not-ended-but-top-level-political-
conversations-about-them-have/?utm_term=.637bbbe196cf [https://perma.cc/RR8B-
A34V. See also I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 
835, 844-45 (2008) (recounting the police assaults of Rodney King in Los Angeles, 
Arthur McDuffie in Miami, Nathaniel Jones in Cincinnati, Robert Davis in New 
Orleans, and Amadou Diallo and Sean Bell in New York). 
 7. Jin Hee Lee & Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do Black Lives Matter to the Courts?, 
in POLICING THE BLACK MAN 274 (Angela Davis ed., 2017) (“One of the most 
frequently articulated frustrations of the black community is the lack of accountability 
for police abuse, especially for the unjustified killings of black individuals. . . . [T]he 
conviction of individual police officers would offer some vindication for the 
widespread misconduct faced by communities of color at the hands of police 
departments as a whole.”). 
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To ignore these calls by pursuing informal justice practices in 
lieu of criminal prosecutions would likely undermine the objectives of 
reconciliation. It would reinforce the double standard citizens perceive 
when police officers are not charged with misconduct.8 Officers are 
rarely subject to sanction for their misconduct—whether that 
misconduct be falsification of evidence or acts of brutality.9 In the rare 
instances when action is taken, police are shielded by protections not 
typically available to others in the criminal system.10 This double 
standard is especially present when comparing the treatment of police 
to those most disproportionately ensnared in the criminal system: low-
income men of color.11 Moreover, the United States has a long legacy 
of state-sanctioned violence against people of color12 that feeds the 
culture of impunity surrounding police brutality.13 Asking citizens 
who are being systematically oppressed to reconcile with their 
oppressors is unacceptable unless society simultaneously works to end 
that oppression.14 Yet prosecutors are consistently unwilling or unable 
                                                   
 8. See id. at 258-259; see also id. at 279-80 (“When it comes to prosecutions 
of police officers accused of killing black victims . . . there is a legitimate concern 
about the existence of a double standard with respect to how much evidence 
establishes a reasonable doubt and how much of a presumption of innocence officers 
receive, as compared to the black criminal defendants who come from the same 
communities as the black victims of police abuse.”). 
 9. See Police Violence Map, MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE, 
https://mappingpoliceviolence.org [https://perma.cc/3EFY-MCVE] (last visited Feb. 
17, 2019). In 2015, 99% of cases in which police shot and killed civilians resulted in 
no convictions. Id. In the vast majority of these cases, the offending officers were not 
even charged with a crime. Id. See also Fatal Force: Police Shootings 2016 Database, 
WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings-
2016/ [https://perma.cc/T3VR-37E6] (last visited Mar. 4, 2019) (noting that of the 
963 cases of people being shot and killed by police in 2016 only thirteen resulted in 
charges of murder or manslaughter).  
 10. See Kate Levine, How We Prosecute the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 745, 755-
56 (2016). 
 11. See Capers, supra note 6, at 874; see also Levine, supra note 10, at 755-
56. 
 12. Lee & Ifill, supra note 7, at 255-56 (“The undeniable truth is that black 
men, women and children have long been the victims of state violence. Government-
sanctioned slavery, which took the lives of millions of Africans forced into servitude, 
gave way to a government-sanctioned convict leasing system and lynchings during 
the Jim Crow era.”). The same is true for other people of color in the United States 
who have all also been targeted at various times throughout the nation’s history for 
both higher incidents of violence and lower degrees of protection by the State.  
 13. Capers, supra note 6. 
 14. Greensboro TRC Report, supra note 1, at 19. It is for this reason that this 
Article is titled using the words of Archbishop Desmond Tutu: “How can I reconcile 
with you when your foot is on my neck?”  
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to secure justice for victims of police violence.15 Until the American 
criminal justice system addresses this justice imbalance that holds 
police officers to a lower standard than the communities they police, 
meaningful reconciliation is impossible.  
This Article offers a unique reform proposal to address the 
systemic causes of this two-tiered justice system. Rather than 
foregoing the formal criminal system for informal justice practices in 
the case of police shootings,16 the formal justice system, as a whole, 
needs to be made more restorative. Many prosecutors are currently 
unable or unwilling to bring charges or seek convictions against police 
officers because they are dependent on officer cooperation to make 
out their cases. This dependency can cause prosecutors to rely on 
officer narratives in charging decisions and trial strategy, even when 
those narratives are problematic, biased, or false. A shift to a more 
restorative criminal system would decrease prosecutor reliance on 
officers and therefore decrease the degree to which prosecutors are 
complicit in officer perjury. It may also increase a prosecutor’s ability 
to dispel pro-police narratives in prosecutions of police misconduct. 
As prosecutors are increasingly willing to bring charges against 
officers and increasingly successful in securing convictions when 
warranted, they will be serving their core function to condemn 
                                                   
 15. See Police Violence Map, supra note 9. See also Angela Davis, 
Introduction to POLICING THE BLACK MAN: ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND 
IMPRISONMENT xi-xii (Angela Davis ed., 2017). An analysis done by The Washington 
Post and Bowling Green State University indicated that since 2005, out of thousands 
of fatal shootings by law enforcement, only fifty-four officers have been charged with 
or indicted for a crime resulting from the shootings. See Kimberly Kindy & Kimbriell 
Kelly, Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2015),  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/11/thousands-dead-few-
prosecuted/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.164c68493d19 [https://perma.cc/TC4M-
XLNE]. 
 16. See Jill E. Williams, Legitimacy and Effectiveness of a Grassroots Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143, 143 (2009). Informal 
justice practices were used in Greensboro, North Carolina following the failed 
prosecution of Ku Klux Klan members who shot and killed five demonstrators at a 
“Death to the Klan” rally in 1979. See id. at 144. Decades later, Greensboro held one 
of the few Truth and Reconciliation Commissions convened in the United States. See 
id. at 144-45. However, its results were mixed and the Executive Director herself has 
recognized that many believe the City is just as divided after the Commission as it 
was before. See id. at 148. Similarly, the truth commission convened in the wake of 
Chicago’s police torture scandal was criticized as “less a vehicle for truth-seeking, 
and more a Hail-Mary play for state prisoners who have long since exhausted all other 
types of formal judicial relief.” See Kim D. Chanbonpin, Truth Stories: Credibility 
Determinations at the Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission, 45 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 1085, 1088 (2014). 
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wrongdoing and uphold our societal values by protecting all citizens 
from violence and harm. 
Part I raises some of the criticisms of informal justice systems 
when used in lieu of formal prosecutions. It then addresses some of 
the shortcomings of the American criminal system’s focus on 
retribution over rehabilitation and restoration.17 This Part then 
addresses some of the ways informal restorative practices, used 
alongside the formal justice system, could improve outcomes and 
stakeholder satisfaction.  
Next, Part II argues that prosecutorial dependence on police 
testimony has in part contributed to prosecutors’ failure to address 
police perjury and misconduct. This failure to address police 
falsification allows fact finder presumptions of officer truthfulness to 
persist despite the prevalence of police perjury. These presumptions 
severely hamper a prosecutor’s ability to rebut claims of self-defense 
raised by police defendants—particularly in cases involving the 
killing of citizens of color, where cultural narratives of criminality 
compound the problem. The resulting acquittals and failed indictments 
perpetuate the culture of impunity for police misconduct and 
mistreatment of citizens, making such incidents more likely to keep 
recurring.18 
                                                   
 17. For the purposes of this Article, the dominant framework of the American 
criminal system is defined as retributive as this Article focuses on prosecutorial 
decision-making. Retributivism is the dominant framework within which most 
prosecutors exercise their discretion. By and large, American prosecutors are guided 
in their decision-making processes by the three questions that Howard Zehr uses to 
define a retributive system: “What laws have been broken? Who did it? What do they 
deserve?” See HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 20 (2015); 
See also Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 255, 257 
(2015) (noting that the “classic asserted purpose” of the criminal system is to identify 
wrongdoers). It is worth noting that Natapoff, among other scholars, argues that, 
although retribution is the “asserted” purpose of the criminal system, in fact the 
criminal system in the United States primarily functions as a form of social 
management and control. See id. This is also the argument made by Michelle 
Alexander in The New Jim Crow, the history of which is outlined by Bryan Stevenson 
in his essay, A Presumption of Guilt. See Bryan Stevenson, A Presumption of Guilt, 
in POLICING THE BLACK MAN: ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND IMPRISONMENT 5 (Angela 
J. Davis ed., 2017). This Article does not dispute that characterization, nor that it may, 
in fact, be the dominant framework of the criminal system. However, this Article is 
focused primarily on individual prosecutors and their decision-making, which is 
typically oriented around the retributive questions of determining who is responsible 
for a specific criminal act and what their punishment should be. 
 18. See, e.g., Patryk Labuda, Racial Reconciliation in Mississippi: An 
Evaluation of the Proposal to Establish a Mississippi Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, 27 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1, 16 (2011) (arguing that failed 
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Lastly, Part III proposes that rather than relying on extrajudicial 
restorative practices, such as truth commissions, to make up for 
failures of the retributive system, reformers instead should advocate 
to integrate more restorative practices into the current criminal system 
in order to reduce the reliance of prosecutors on police narratives.19 
Using restorative rather than retributive principles to guide prosecutor 
decision-making—even while remaining in a largely retributive 
framework—would necessarily decrease reliance on police testimony 
because a restorative framework causes prosecutors to focus more on 
offenses involving victims and less on public order crimes that rely 
exclusively on officer testimony.20 This could create more 
opportunities to expose and address police misconduct and potentially 
create a greater acceptance of the narratives of people of color, which 
currently are often rejected in favor of pro-police narratives. The 
Article concludes by looking at a few ways to bring about this cultural 
shift in prosecution, including changes in how law schools and district 
attorney offices educate and train future prosecutors. 
I. COMBINING INFORMAL AND FORMAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS MAY 
ACHIEVE BETTER OUTCOMES FOR VICTIMS, OFFENDERS, AND 
SOCIETY 
Research has shown that when informal justice mechanisms21 are 
used in lieu of formal justice practices, the informal mechanisms have 
an overall negative impact on democracy and human rights.22 Formal 
                                                   
prosecutions “harbor the danger of defeating truth and justice in one fell swoop, 
making a mockery of the criminal justice system and leaving the victims in an even 
worse position. Given the long history of illegitimate trials and tacit support of racism 
. . . in the United States, the possibility of defendants walking free with the state’s (or 
federal government’s) seal of approval is particularly troubling.”) 
 19. Howard Zehr defines restorative justice as “a process to involve, to the 
extent possible, those who have a stake in a specific offense or harm to collectively 
identify and address harms, needs and obligations in order to heal and put things as 
right as possible.” See ZEHR, supra note 17, at 40. 
 20. See id. at 20 (defining the restorative system by a series of questions: 
“Who has been hurt? What are their needs? Whose obligations are these?”). 
 21. This Article uses “informal justice” to refer to processes such as truth 
commissions or other mechanisms that fall outside of traditional, formal criminal 
adjudications. See Chanbonpin, supra note 16, at 1090 (citing ANDREW WOOLFORD & 
R.S. RATNER, INFORMAL RECKONINGS: CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN MEDIATION, 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND REPARATIONS 4 (2008)). 
 22. See TRICIA D. OLSEN ET AL., TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN BALANCE: 
COMPARING PROCESSES, WEIGHING EFFICACY 144 (2011). In particular, the study 
showed that truth commissions, working alone, had an overall negative impact on 
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justice practices, such as criminal prosecutions, seek to uphold human 
rights norms and values through accountability, proportional 
retribution, and procedural fairness.23 Allowing wrongdoing—
particularly state-sanctioned wrongdoing—to go unpunished risks 
undermining human rights.24 Combining formal and informal justice 
systems has been shown to have a positive impact on human rights.25 
This Part explores a few of the shortcomings of both the formal and 
informal justice systems,26 including one of the most commonly used 
informal justice mechanisms—the truth commission.27 It then explores 
some of the ways that combining restorative and retributive 
approaches could overcome some of these shortcomings. 
A. Perpetrator Denial May Thwart Informal Justice Practices  
Informal justice practices, including truth commissions and 
other restorative processes, tend to succeed only when perpetrators 
                                                   
transitional justice. See id. The author, however, did find that a combination of truth 
commissions, amnesties, and trials had a positive impact on democracy and human 
rights, confirming the “holistic approach” to transitional justice. See id. at 144-46. 
 23. RICHARD A. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN 
SOUTH AFRICA: LEGITIMIZING THE POST-APARTHEID STATE (2001). 
 24. See id. at 230. (“[I]t is misguided to delegitimize human rights at the 
national level by detaching them from a retributive understanding of justice and 
attaching them to a religious notion of reconciliation-forgiveness, a regrettable 
amnesty law and an elite project of nation-building. Democratizing regimes should 
not seek legitimacy through nation-building, efforts to forge a moral unity and 
communitarian discourses, but on the basis of accountability and justice defined as 
proportional retribution and procedural fairness. The role of human rights and the rule 
of law in all of this is to create the bedrock of accountability upon which democratic 
legitimacy is built.”). 
 25. See Tricia D. Olsen et al., The Justice Balance: When Transitional Justice 
Improves Human Rights and Democracy, 32 HUM. RTS. Q. 980, 982 (2010) (citing an 
empirical analysis indicating that both trials and amnesty were a necessary, but not 
sufficient, component of transitional justice, and that combined approaches of either 
trials and amnesty or trials, amnesty and truth commissions were the only 
circumstances which saw significant positive results); see also Miriam Aukerman, 
Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding Transitional 
Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 43 (2002). 
 26. Note that this Article attempts to address shortcomings of these systems 
only in principle, not in practice. Addressing the countless injustices of the American 
criminal system in practice is far beyond the scope of this Article. 
 27. See Olsen, supra note 25, at 982 (defining truth commissions as “an 
alternative, victim-oriented restorative justice mechanism that holds perpetrators 
accountable through non-judicial processes.”). Other non-judicial accountability 
schemata include reports by international delegations, lustration, civil liability, 
reparations, and historical inquiry. See Aukerman, supra note 25, at 43. 
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take responsibility for their actions.28 Criminal justice scholars note 
that “an important antecedent to rehabilitation” is for offenders to 
accept responsibility for their wrongdoing.29 For victims, acts of 
violence send the message that their lives are of less value than that of 
the perpetrator.30 The acknowledgement of wrongdoing through the 
acceptance of responsibility and the showing of true remorse counters 
this message and may serve to undo some of the harm wrought.31 Thus, 
acceptance of blame is a critical component for both the victim and 
the perpetrator to move forward.  
Unfortunately, informal justice does not offer a clear means to 
ensure victim healing when perpetrators deny wrongdoing.32 
Admitting wrongdoing, particularly where one’s actions are 
                                                   
 28. See ZEHR, supra note 17, at 46 (“[T]here is a prerequisite that the offender 
acknowledge, at least to some extent, his or her responsibility.”); see also Oliver 
Diggelmann, International Criminal Tribunals and Reconciliation: Reflections on the 
Role of Remorse and Apology, 14 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1073, 1086 (2016) (“Empirical 
research has found that victims of human rights abuses are indeed more forgiving 
when they believe a wrongdoer is truly sorry.”). 
 29. See James W. Diehm, Pleading Guilty While Claiming Innocence: 
Reconsidering the Mysterious Alford Plea, 26 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 27, 39 
(2015); see also Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive Criminal Law Values and 
Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1361, 1363 (2003) (arguing that pleas that allow offenders to forego accepting 
responsibility for their offense impede the reform, education, and condemnation of 
guilty defendants). 
 30. Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (1998) 
(“[T]he retributive motive for inflicting suffering is to annul or counter the appearance 
of the wrongdoer’s superiority and thus affirm the victim’s real value.”). 
 31. See Diggelmann, supra note 28, at 1079 (“Sincere remorse . . . can have 
an amazing healing effect. Particularly face-to-face expressions of remorse may 
matter immensely to victims. Research has shown that a substantial percentage of 
victims are highly interested in meeting with offenders. Seeing the offender himself 
suffer may open up a road to reconnect. Remorse is painful, and as suffering from 
pain cannot be evil, there is always some ‘good’ in meetings between remorseful 
offenders and victims. The victim ‘visits’ the wounds of the perpetrator. Symbolically, 
the moral balance is restored, at least partially. The message of the crime—that the 
community norms do not apply to the wrongdoer and that he is superior to the 
victim—is modified.”). See, e.g., Lindsey Bever, A Rape Victim was Just Awarded $1 
Billion. Jurors Told Her: ‘You’re Worth Something.’, WASH. POST (May 24, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/05/24/ 
a-rape-victim-was-just-awarded-1-billion-jurors-told-her-youre-worth-
something/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6c286b9e7331 [https://perma.cc/3D59-
XPWC]. But see Rocksheng Zhong, So You’re Sorry? The Role of Remorse in 
Criminal Law 11 (2013) (unpublished M.D. thesis, Yale University) (arguing that 
there is actually no clear empirical evidence to support a correlation between remorse 
and decreased recidivism). 
 32. See ZEHR, supra note 17, at 46. 
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reprehensible or shameful, is incredibly difficult.33 Perpetrators may 
avoid these feelings of shame by lying not only to others—their 
family, friends, and the public—but also to themselves.34 In this state 
of denial, the perpetrator loses the opportunity to acknowledge his or 
her wrongdoing, examine its underlying causes, and ultimately change 
his or her behavior.35 Without an external mechanism to challenge that 
denial, he or she is permitted to persist in believing that he or she is 
without blame.36 As an informal process, restorative practices lack the 
institutional authority to counteract this denial.37 Failure to dispel 
denial increases the risk of recidivism for the individual,38 and failure 
to meaningfully condemn the perpetrator’s actions increases the risk 
of more of the same behavior in society as a whole.39 When society 
fails to condemn wrongdoing, it fails to enforce societal norms and the 
collective moral code, contributing to their degradation.40 Perhaps for 
these reasons, victims of human rights abuse tend to indicate higher 
levels of satisfaction in prosecution than in informal practices such as 
truth commissions,41 and they often see prosecutions as more likely to 
achieve communal goals of truth and justice.42  
                                                   
 33. See Bibas, supra note 29, at 1393. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. at 1395. Howard Zehr argues that “those who have caused harm 
need justice to provide[] accountability that addresses the resulting harms, encourages 
empathy and responsibility, and transforms shame.” ZEHR, supra note 17, at 25. 
 36. See Bibas, supra note 29, at 1390-91 (arguing that inadequate response 
to offender denial of wrongdoing leaves in place the psychological denial mechanisms 
of offenders). 
 37. See ZEHR, supra note 17, at 76 (recognizing that it is the strength of the 
retributive system, not the restorative system, to identify the origin of harm and 
wrongdoing). For truth commissions in particular, this inability may be due to any 
number of factors—the inability of a commission to offer amnesty for admission of 
wrongdoing, unofficial commissions lacking subpoena power or the ability to grant 
immunity, or simply the lack of incentive due to a lack of threat of punishment.  
 38. Bibas, supra note 29, at 1390-91 (“Punishment seeks to teach by 
triggering and developing the offender’s sense of guilt. It tries to induce contrition 
and repentance so that the offender will repudiate his past wrongful act and avoid 
committing it again.”).  
 39. Richard A. Wilson, Challenging Restorative Justice, 2 HUM. RTS. 
DIALOGUE 7 (2002), (“The delegitimation of human rights in relation to popular 
understandings of justice is also one factor in the upsurge of criminality in South 
Africa. At the high point of resistance to apartheid in 1986, there were 9,913 
homicides in South Africa; in the year 2000, there were 23,823.”). 
 40. Id. See Bibas, supra note 29, at 1390-91. 
 41. See Matiangai V.S. Sirleaf, Beyond Truth and Punishment in Transitional 
Justice, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 223, 275–76 (2014). 
 42. See Raquel Aldana-Pinedell, An Emerging Universality of Justiciable 
Victims’ Rights in the Criminal Process to Curtail Impunity for State-Sponsored 
 How Can I Reconcile with You? 1359 
B. The Formal Justice System is Uniquely Equipped to Overcome 
Denial of Wrongdoing 
It is largely within the province of prosecutors to condemn 
wrongdoing and uphold society’s moral code through the initiation of 
criminal charges.43 Prosecutors choose whose behavior warrants 
criminal charges and whose does not,44 and prosecutors choose which 
charges to bring and which to forego.45 In so doing, they send a 
message to the larger community about what types of behavior are and 
are not acceptable in our society. Through the adversarial process, 
prosecutors use the threat of sanction to confront and overcome 
perpetrator denial of wrongdoing.46 It is here that restorative justice 
scholars acknowledge that the retributive system finds its greatest 
strength: enforcing human rights by using the adversarial process to 
identify the true origin of harm, even where perpetrators deny 
culpability.47  
Because prosecutors have typically declined to pursue charges, 
most police shootings have not been subject to the adversarial 
process.48 Of the few that have, even fewer have resulted in 
convictions.49 Thus there are few cases of police shootings of civilians 
                                                   
Crimes, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 605, 607 (2004) (noting that many survivors of human rights 
abuses believe that only the effective prosecution of human rights violators will yield 
their goals of truth and justice and prevent future victimization). 
 43. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-
1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. 
 46. Bibas supra note 29, at 1397 (“Even external pressures, such as the threat 
of imprisonment, can induce offenders to overcome their denial.”). 
 47. See ZEHR, supra note 17, at 76. 
 48. The Washington Post and researchers at Bowling Green State University 
have analyzed fatal police shootings since 2005. Their analysis revealed that the 
overwhelming majority of incidents resulting in criminal charges involved both an 
unarmed victim as well as other factors that made the case exceptional, including “a 
victim shot in the back, a video recording of the incident, incriminating testimony 
from other officers or allegations of a cover-up.” This phenomenon led one researcher 
to note, “to charge an officer in a fatal shooting it takes something so egregious, so 
over the top that it cannot be explained in any rational way.” Levine, supra note 10, 
at 764 (quoting Kindy & Kelly, supra note 15). 
 49. See Davis, supra note 15, at xi; Madison Park, Police Shootings: Trials, 
Convictions Are Rare for Officers, CNN (October 3, 2018) https://www.cnn.com/ 
2017/05/18/us/police-involved-shooting-cases/index.html [http://perma.cc/JZS2-
X5DG] (“Few police officers ever face trial for shooting deaths, let alone are 
convicted.”)  Two recent counter-examples: The killing of Laquan McDonald which, 
after a protracted legal battle to release the video footage of the incident, went to trial 
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to rely upon to illustrate this principle of the way in which exposure 
to the adversarial process can overcome perpetrator denial. However, 
the case of Michael Slager is informative, particularly for cases 
involving white officers shooting unarmed men of color. Michael 
Slager was a white South Carolina police officer charged with 
shooting and killing Walter Scott, a black man, during a traffic stop.50 
Initially Slager claimed self-defense, stating that he feared for his life 
because Scott took his stun gun while attempting to flee.51 Video of 
the incident contradicted these claims, showing Slager shooting Scott 
eight times in the back and then appearing to plant an object—
presumably the stun gun—next to his body.52 
At trial, Slager persisted in his denial of wrongdoing. He testified 
that he acted in self-defense and was in “total fear” during his 
interaction with Scott. The jury was unable to reach a verdict, but 
indicated to the attorneys that they were within one vote of convicting 
Slager of manslaughter.53 After the jury hung, the victim’s mother, 
Judy Scott, was interviewed by reporters and expressed her hope for a 
future conviction, stating, “Injustice will not prevail.”54 With the 
information from the jury indicating that a second trial could very well 
result in a guilty verdict, Slager pleaded guilty to the federal civil 
                                                   
and resulted in a guilty verdict on the charge of second-degree murder. The officer 
convicted in that matter, Jason Van Dyke, is the first Chicago officer to be charged 
with murder for an on-duty shooting in roughly fifty years. Don Babwin & Michael 
Tarm, Officer Convicted of Murder in Slaying of Laquan McDonald, AP NEWS (Oct. 
5, 2018), https://apnews.com/862ebaf6890d44de80c0ae74cac3949e 
[http://perma.cc/8GUX-AMTX]. In addition, in August of 2018, a Texas jury found 
former police officer Roy Oliver guilty of murder for the killing of an African–
American high school freshman Jordan Edwards. Oliver had fired into a car full of 
teenagers, including fifteen-year-old Jordan, and was sentenced to fifteen years. Faith 
Karimi & Emanuella Grinberg, Texas Ex-Officer Is Sentenced to 15 Years for Killing 
an Unarmed Teen, CNN (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/29/ 
us/texas-jordan-edwards-death-sentencing-phase/index.html [https://perma.cc/8293-
3XJY]. (“[T]he rare guilty verdict in the trial of a police officer prompted gasps and 
sobs in the courtroom . . . Most police-involved shootings deaths . . . have ended in 
acquittals or no charges.”)  
 50. See Alan Blinder, Michael Slager, Officer in Walter Scott Shooting, Gets 
20-Year Sentence, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/12/07/us/michael-slager-sentence-walter-scott.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/GAH8-LGER]. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See Alan Blinder, Mistrial for South Carolina Officer Who Shot Walter 
Scott, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/05/us/walter-
scott-michael-slager-north-charleston.html [https://perma.cc/5GGZ-CRTC]. 
 54. Id. 
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rights violations in exchange for the state charges being dropped.55 At 
his sentencing hearing, Slager told the court “Walter Scott is no longer 
with his family, and I’m responsible for that. I wish it never would 
have happened. I wish I could go back in time.”56 In response, Mrs. 
Scott forgave him. He then silently mouthed to her the words, “I’m 
sorry,” and she replied, “I know.”57 Slager was then sentenced to 
twenty years in prison.58  
After the hearing, Mrs. Scott told reporters, “I’m supposed to be 
really angry and upset and raging but I can’t—because of the love of 
God in me, I can’t be like that. I feel forgiveness in my heart, even for 
the guy that shot and killed my son.”59 Based on her earlier statement 
about justice, at least some of her forgiveness seems to have been 
predicated on Slager having been held accountable.60 The “external 
pressures” of the system—in this case the combined actions of state 
                                                   
 55. See Michael Sokolove, What Does It Take to Convict a Cop?, MOTHER 
JONES (2017), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/05/michael-slager-trial-
walter-scott-police-shooting-north-charleston-south-carolina-3/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y375-K3FJ]. 
 56. Blinder, supra note 50. This expression is similar to one made by Eugene 
de Kock at the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission to two women 
whose husbands he had murdered. As recounted by Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, de 
Kock tells the women, with tears in his eyes, “I wish there was a way of bringing their 
bodies back alive. I wish I could say, here are your husbands . . . . But unfortunately, 
. . . I have to live with it.” Gobodo-Madikizela marks this as a moment in which she 
and the women experienced empathy for de Kock because his expression of empathy 
and remorse appeared genuine. Jodi Halpern & Harvey M. Weinstein, Rehumanizing 
the Other: Empathy and Reconciliation, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 561, 573 (2004) (citing 
Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, Remorse, Forgiveness, and Rehumanization: Stories 
from South Africa, 42 J. HUMANISTIC PSYCHOL. 7 (2002)). It is notable that while de 
Kock received amnesty for crimes he committed for political reasons, he was not 
pardoned on eighty-nine of the charges against him and was ultimately sentenced to 
212 years in prison. He was one of only three white men after 1994 jailed for apartheid 
atrocities. Antjie Krog, Can an Evil Man Change?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/14/opinion/sunday/ 
the-repentance-of-eugene-de-kock-apartheid-assassin.html [https://perma.cc/D4PX-
7PZ4]. 
 57. See Blinder, supra note 50. The silent “I’m sorry” appeared to be for the 
benefit of Walter Scott’s mother, not the court. Lindsey Bever, ‘Forgiveness Is in My 
Heart,’ A Bereaved Mother Told the Officer Who Shot Her Son in the Back, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/inspired-
life/wp/2017/12/07/forgiveness-is-in-my-heart-a-bereaved-mother-told-the-officer-
who-shot-her-son-in-the-back/?utm_term=.3cb124c368aa [https://perma.cc/P4L5-
N48Y] (“I forgive Michael Slager. I forgive you. Forgiveness is in my heart.”) 
 58. Blinder, supra note 50. 
 59. See Bever, supra note 57. 
 60. See Bever, supra note 57 (quoting Judy Scott from 2015, prior to the trial, 
“He’s got to get convicted.”). See also Diggelmann, supra note 28, at 1079.  
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and federal prosecutors pursuing charges—forced Slager to confront 
and eventually overcome his denial.61 Slager was able to make some 
amends and the victim’s family acknowledged some degree of 
restoration, leading to what appeared to be a genuine “re-balancing of 
the scales.”62 The prosecutors’ use of the criminal system in this case 
condemned the unjustified killing of an unarmed civilian of color by 
a police officer. By pursuing the charges, prosecutors rejected Slager’s 
self-defense claim, which ultimately pushed Slager to surrender his 
denial and accept responsibility for the life he had taken.  
C. The Formal Justice System Oversimplifies Both Harms and 
Parties, Making It Incapable of Meaningfully Addressing 
Systemic Injustice 
While the retributive system has a unique strength in 
overcoming denial, this is partially because its adversarial nature 
focuses almost exclusively on the question of guilt.63 This can 
marginalize and silence victim experiences. In the criminal system, 
the opportunities for victim–offender confrontation are limited both in 
time and in scope and are always subject to the adversarial nature of 
the proceeding. This can mean that victims seeking to be heard are 
curtailed by time constraints, cross-examination, or relevancy 
objections, limiting their opportunity for restoration. The focus on 
proving guilt has caused many victims to feel “disillusioned with the 
adversarial system . . . and pin their hopes on non-adversarial 
restorative justice mechanisms, such as truth-telling.”64 The retributive 
schema takes what is often a complex web of stories and artificially 
reduces the number of participants and narratives in order to 
exclusively answer the question of who is most directly at fault.65 Very 
few acts of violence affect only the individuals directly involved; 
family members, friends, community members, witnesses, and others 
may be directly or indirectly affected.66 Excluding the wider 
community can leave survivors shouldering their trauma alone, 
                                                   
 61. Bibas, supra note 29, at 1363-1365 (describing the case of Kathleen 
Soliah, who only accepted responsibility and apologized for her role in the kidnapping 
of Patricia Hearst after a judge denied her attempt to withdraw her guilty plea). 
 62. See ZEHR, supra note 17, at 59 (arguing that both retribution and 
restoration share a primary goal of “balancing the scales” when a harm has been 
caused or a wrong done). 
 63. See Labuda, supra note 18, at 30. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id.  
 66. See id. at 17. 
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without a sense of their place in a larger story of injustice and 
communal trauma. In addition, the singular focus on individual 
perpetrators tends to “absolve other [parties, including] states, groups, 
bystanders[,] and the rest of society of any responsibility.”67 Thus, the 
retributive system’s sole focus on proving individualized guilt inhibits 
opportunities to probe society’s complicity in systemic problems like 
racially motivated violence.68  
Because the retributive system focuses almost exclusively on the 
question of individual guilt, it also artificially reduces the scope of the 
offense, limiting its ability to seat the incident in the context of a 
particular community, power dynamic, or historical legacy.69 
“[A]lthough litigation is adept at resolving claims based on discrete 
events and individual experiences, it is not conducive to the 
recognition of collective, inter-generational injuries wrought by 
structural and systemic causes.”70 Criminal trials do not typically give 
voice to a full airing of the societal circumstances, factors, and values 
that shape and inform the individual actions of the participants. This 
is particularly true for historical or systemic factors that are, from a 
court’s perspective, too attenuated to be relevant to the question of 
guilt and thus inadmissible at trial. 
The criminal system alone, then, is unlikely to effectively change 
police practices or present a meaningful challenge to historical 
legacies, such as the systemic racism pervading police departments 
                                                   
 67. See Sirleaf, supra note 41, at 249. A recent example would be the Larry 
Nassar case, which, had it gone to trial, likely would have focused exclusively on 
Nassar’s conduct, potentially obscuring the roles of the countless individuals who 
facilitated and covered up the abuse. See, e.g., Eric Levenson, Larry Nassar Sentenced 
to up to 175 Years in Prison for Decades of Sexual Abuse, CNN (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/24/us/larry-nassar-sentencing/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/H24L-QJD2]; see also Lauren Green, U.S. Gymnast Maggie Nichols 
Says She Was Abused by Larry Nassar, Dissuaded From Coming Forward By USA 
Gymnastics, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.si.com/olympics/ 
2018/01/09/maggie-nichols-larry-nassar-sexual-abuse-usa-gymnastics 
[https://perma.cc/JDP7-5YB4]; Matt Pearce, Michigan State University President 
Resigns Amid Widening Calls for Accountability over Larry Nassar Abuse Scandal, 
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2018), http://www.latimes.com/nation/ 
la-na-nassar-accountability-20180124-story.html [https://perma.cc/S8PA-RN47]. 
 68. See Labuda, supra note 18. 
 69. See id. at 14 (describing how the individual trials of Klansmen for 
racially-motivated violence was necessary, but not sufficient, as they focused “on a 
narrowly circumscribed set of facts [which] meant that much of Mississippi’s history 
remained in the shadows”). 
 70. See Chanbonpin, supra note 16, at 1112. 
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and the criminal justice system.71 In cases of police shootings 
involving civilians of color, two responses tend to emerge to defend 
officers. One is a full-throated denial that often involves victim-
blaming and either implicit or explicit allusions to black criminality.72 
The second is what has been referred to as the “bad apple” narrative, 
which asserts that credible incidents of unjustified police violence 
toward citizens of color are aberrations attributable solely to the 
individual officer.73 The former can be addressed through the criminal 
trial; the latter typically cannot. This individualistic approach to 
wrongdoing ignores the long legacy of police violence toward 
Americans of color and the culture of impunity that enables that 
violence.74 This limits the ability to expose and confront systemic 
racism in policing or to bring about meaningful institutional change.75 
Viewing these cases individually as anomalies or outliers rather than 
as part of an ongoing system or practice allows widespread patterns of 
institutional misconduct to persist.76 
In contrast to the formal criminal system, an informal justice 
practice is well positioned to confront “the systemic and historical 
causes of widespread social harms.”77 This process may help society 
to uncover dynamics of oppression that otherwise would go 
unrecognized. “Historical inquiry can . . . lay bare the kind of 
ideologies that gave rise to the crimes being investigated, and in so 
doing, make us alert to any renewed currents of similar ideologies that 
                                                   
 71. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2012); 
ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME 149-170 (2018). And see 
Stevenson, supra note 17, at 26 (“What threatened to kill me on the streets of Atlanta 
when I was a young attorney wasn’t just a misguided police officer with a gun, it was 
the force of America’s history of racial injustice and the presumption of guilt it 
created.”).  
 72. See generally PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN (2017). 
 73. See Chanbonpin, supra note 16, at 1115 (calling this the “dominant 
narrative of police torture,” which ignores the contributing factors of broader-scale 
forces such as racism and inadequate police accountability mechanisms); see 
generally ALEXANDER, supra note 71 (arguing that this notion is reinforced by the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on race and crime that racial animus, whether from a 
police officer, prosecutor, or party, must be overt and intentional to be recognized and 
reparable).  
 74. See Chanbonpin, supra note 16, at 1115 (arguing that the bad apple 
narrative “renders invisible the State’s complicity in police torture”). 
 75. See id. at 1108. 
 76. See id.  
 77. See id. at 1108. 
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could, if we are not watchful, lead to similar crimes.”78 Truth 
commissions in particular can also help divided societies arrive at a 
universally accepted truth through exhaustive historical accounting 
combined with the testimony of affected individuals.79 Through that 
process, truth commissions allow space for more than one kind of 
truth.80  
While the criminal system necessarily values some narratives 
more than others in order to ascertain guilt, truth-telling spaces may 
give victims the opportunity to gather and take part in creating a 
narrative outside of the “official story” of the incident.81 The more 
expansive scope of inquiry and “more informal and inclusive approach 
to testimony” allow informal justice mechanisms to forgo weighing 
truths and instead allow more narratives to enter the public sphere.82 
This can begin to help societies dismantle pervasive stereotypes and 
narratives. “[I]t has been argued that the way to make a deep cultural 
transformation is through the dissemination of counter-narratives, 
narratives that undermine or counterbalance the dominant masterplots 
of a culture and thus weaken the power of prejudicial types.”83  
Truth commissions and other informal justice mechanisms, by 
permitting statements and narratives that may be disfavored in 
adversarial criminal trials, create a space for that dissemination. In the 
case of police shootings of Americans of color, stereotypes and 
dominant cultural narratives play a tremendous role both in the way 
                                                   
 78. TERESA GOODWIN PHELPS, SHATTERED VOICES: LANGUAGE, VIOLENCE, 
AND THE WORK OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 80 (2006). 
 79. James L. Gibson, Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided 
Nation?, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 82, 93 (2006) (“One of the 
objectives of the truth and reconciliation process was to create a collective memory 
for South Africa. A collective memory is an accepted version of the truth about the 
country’s past. By establishing a collective memory, it becomes difficult (although 
not impossible) for people to deny that certain activities took place.”). 
 80. See TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT 110 (1998) (discussing the 
work of the Commission that led to “four notions of truth: factual or forensic truth; 
personal or narrative truth; social or ‘dialogue’ truth . . . and healing and restorative 
truth.”); see also Chanbonpin, supra note 16, at 1115-16 (criticizing the four-part 
credibility test utilized by the Chicago Torture Commission as replicating the 
problems of the retributive system—including the “bad apple” narrative—by failing 
to allow for multiple forms of truth). 
 81. See LISA MAGARRELL & JOYA WESLEY, LEARNING FROM GREENSBORO: 
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN THE UNITED STATES 39 (2008). 
 82. Id.  
 83. H. PORTER ABBOTT, THE CAMBRIDGE INTRODUCTION TO NARRATIVE 188 
(2d ed. 2008). 
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the cases are treated by the criminal system and the way they are 
perceived by the public.84 Prosecutors can take the first step in 
rejecting these narratives by bringing criminal charges against officers 
whose self-defense claims invoke them, like the prosecutors did in the 
Michael Slager case and in the prosecution of Jason Van Dyke, the 
officer who shot and killed Laquan McDonald in Chicago.85 
Communities can take the second step after the prosecution is 
concluded by engaging in truth and reconciliation practices that 
further expose and confront those stereotypes in order to help all 
community members move past them.   
D. Neither a Formal Retributive Justice System nor Informal 
Restorative Justice Practices Are Sufficient to Bring About 
Reconciliation 
Restorative justice practices offer a less adversarial space in 
which deeper reconciliation between the parties can take place after 
the work of determining fault is over. Their focus on restoring victims 
to wholeness can balance the formal justice system’s singular focus 
on perpetrators. Restorative practices that bring in the larger 
community can create a space for more stakeholders to be heard or to 
bear witness. The retributive system can help lay the groundwork for 
reconciliation in these spaces by challenging cultures of impunity 
through accountability, providing mechanisms whereby perpetrators 
are incentivized to accept responsibility for their wrongdoings, and 
allowing all parties to enter the informal justice space on even ground 
without replicating dynamics of oppression. Informal justice practices, 
including truth-telling, restorative circles, and victim–offender 
mediation, can create a space for the unofficial stories of victims to be 
heard and disseminate these unofficial stories into society. This could 
expand society’s understanding of cultural narratives and ultimately 
help dispel harmful stereotypes.  
                                                   
 84. See infra Part II (exploring the ways in which deep-seated cultural 
stereotypes about black criminality affect case outcomes for African Americans both 
as defendants and victims). 
 85. See Babwin & Tarm, supra note 49. See also Greg Allen, ‘Today We 
Have Justice’—Florida Police Officer Convicted in 2015 Shooting, NPR, 
https://www.npr.org/2019/03/07/701266147/today-we-have-justice-florida-police-
officer-convicted-in-2015-shooting [https://perma.cc/2ETT-2A3P] (describing the 
guilty verdict in the shooting death of Corey Jones despite the self-defense claim 
raised by former Palm Beach Gardens police officer Nouman Raja). 
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However, the benefits of the formal justice system are lost when 
prosecutors fail to first obtain justice for victims.86 Without the 
condemnation associated with criminal charges and—perhaps more 
importantly—convictions, the denial of wrongdoing or the belief that 
one’s actions are condoned by society persists and may further enable 
individual and systemic violence. This is already a concern for police 
officers who are given tremendous authority, discretion, and power in 
how they interact with citizens. It is of particular concern in cases 
involving police interactions with citizens of color. Despite the need 
for criminal prosecution of officer misconduct to uphold society’s 
moral code and despite the unique position of the formal justice 
system to overcome officer denial of misconduct, prosecutors rarely 
exercise their ability to charge officers. The next Part addresses one 
set of factors among many for this failure of American prosecutors to 
successfully pursue charges against police officers. 
II. PROSECUTOR DEPENDENCY ON POLICE WITNESSES BREEDS 
COMPLICITY WITH POLICE MISCONDUCT 
The case of Michael Slager is a true outlier. Throughout the 
criminal system, injustice routinely prevails.87 Numerous factors 
contribute to the sense of a double standard for officer behavior: (1) 
the law’s permissiveness toward the use of deadly force by police,88 
                                                   
 86. Aldana-Pinedell, supra note 42, at 607 (“Impunity, therefore, arises when 
states fail to investigate, prosecute and punish right to life and humane treatment 
violations in accordance with their duty to prosecute. Impunity also generally refers 
to states’ widespread failure to carry out their duty to prosecute, although impunity 
can also exist in individual cases or as to specific types of offenses or victims within 
a criminal justice system.”). 
 87. See Capers, supra note 6, at 847 (referring to the initial acquittal of the 
officers who attacked Rodney King as the rule, not the exception, evidencing that in 
the rare case where the government does bring an indictment, convictions are even 
rarer still); see also Blinder, supra note 50 (“The case against Mr. Slager is one of the 
few instances in which a police officer has been prosecuted for an on-duty shooting.”). 
Recently, an officer was acquitted in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania for shooting 
and killing Antwon Rose, an unarmed black teenager in the back while the teen fled 
during a traffic stop. The defendant had been an East Pittsburgh police officer for 
three weeks, and previously left the University of Pittsburgh police force “after 
discrepancies were found between one of his sworn statements and evidence in an 
arrest.” Adeel Hassan, Antwon Rose Shooting: White Police Officer Acquitted in 
Death of Black Teenager, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/22/us/antwon-rose-shooting.html 
[https://perma.cc/RD47-UBKZ]. 
 88. Deadly Force: Police Use of Lethal Force in the United States, AMNESTY 
INT’L (June 17, 2015), https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/deadly-force-police-use-
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(2) the police code of silence—often referred to as “the blue wall of 
silence,”89 (3) the differential treatment of police defendants in the 
criminal system—particularly the indicting grand jury system,90 (4) 
the heightened presumption of innocence and burden of proof in cases 
involving officer defendants, and—in the case of victims of color—
(5) persistent tropes and stereotypes about the lawlessness of non-
                                                   
of-lethal-force-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/726X-GVED] (“Amnesty 
International reviewed US state laws—where they exist—governing the use of lethal 
force by law enforcement officials and found that they all fail to comply with 
international law and standards. Many of them do not even meet the less stringent 
standard set by US constitutional law.”). Amnesty International found that all fifty 
states and Washington, D.C. fail to comply with international law and standards on 
the use of lethal force by law enforcement officers. Id. Nine states and Washington, 
D.C. currently have no laws on use of lethal force by law enforcement officers. Id. 
Thirteen states have laws that do not comply with the lower standards set by United 
States constitutional law on use of lethal force by law enforcement officers. Id. No 
state requires that the use of lethal force be used only as a last resort and for less 
harmful means to be tried first. Id. No state limits the use of lethal force to only those 
situations where there is an imminent threat to life or serious injury to the officer or 
to others. Id. 
 89. The “blue wall of silence” is typically defined as the way in which police 
either refuse to testify against one another or testify favorably, albeit untruthfully, to 
protect one another from criminal allegations. See Levine, supra note 10, at 749; see 
also MILTON MOLLEN ET. AL, COMM’N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE 
CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP’T, 
ANATOMY OF FAILURE: A PATH FOR SUCCESS 53 (1994) [hereinafter MOLLEN 
COMMISSION REPORT]; Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” 
as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 PITT. 
L. REV. 233, 237 (1998).  
 90. See Ric Simmons, The Role of the Prosecutor and the Grand Jury in 
Police Use of Deadly Force Cases: Restoring the Grand Jury to Its Original Purpose, 
65 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 519, 522, 524 (2017) (noting that nearly all non-police defendant 
cases sent to an indicting grand jury result in indictments being returned, yet the 
majority of cases involving police officers do not); see also Levine, supra note 10, at 
755-56 (“[W]hen the police are the suspects, the usual charge and indictment process 
appears to unravel. This can be seen in the unusually detailed presentation of evidence 
to the grand jury in the choking death of Eric Garner at the hands of police in Staten 
Island, New York, which lead to no indictment. It is also apparent in the investigation 
into the police shooting of twelve-year-old Tamir Rice in Cleveland, Ohio, and the 
grand jury’s decision not to indict there. It took the prosecutor more than a year to 
present the case to a grand jury, and before doing so, three commissioned independent 
reports were released discussing the facts of the shooting and concluding that the 
officers had not committed criminal acts. This seemingly extraordinary process for 
police suspects, before they formally become defendants through charge or 
indictment, has been maligned by the public, the legal community, and scholars. It 
has been seen as a way for prosecutors to exculpate criminal suspects whom they do 
not want to prosecute.”).  
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white citizens.91 All of these areas, and more, have generated calls for 
reform.92 
As argued in Section I.C, criminal charges are a necessary—
albeit not sufficient—step toward ending the culture of impunity 
surrounding police violence.93 Yet, American prosecutors are heavily 
dependent on police officers to make out their cases, making 
prosecutors often reluctant to pursue charges against them.94 This 
dependency is heightened in cases involving public-order offenses or 
other “victimless” crimes where officer testimony is the only evidence 
offered. If prosecutors used restorative rather than retributive practices 
to drive decision-making, they would rely less on police testimony 
overall, decreasing dependency. This Article will address that 
                                                   
 91. See Robert M. Entman & Kimberly A. Gross, Race to Judgment: 
Stereotyping Media and Criminal Defendants, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 97-100 
(2008) (“Media stereotypes consist of recurring messages that associate persons of 
color with traits, behaviors, and values generally considered undesirable, inferior, or 
dangerous. In the context of crime coverage, there is considerable evidence that media 
portray blacks and Latinos as criminal and violent.”) (citing research indicating that 
people of color are more likely to appear as lawbreakers, particularly in violent crime 
features, that depictions of black suspects tend to be more symbolically threatening, 
and that images of poverty tend to conflate crime, violence and people of color); see 
also Bryan Adamson, Reconsidering Pre-Indictment Publicity: Racialized Crime 
News, Grand Juries and Tamir Rice, 8 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 31 (2017); Lee & 
Ifill, supra note 7, at 260 (“At the heart of this discrimination is the automatic 
association between ‘blackness’ and criminality that is the product of the longstanding 
dehumanization of black people throughout American history.”) 
 92. See Capers, supra note 6, at 874-75 (“One, where there is reasonable 
suspicion that an officer has engaged in testilying, investigation should be mandatory 
and two, where the investigation establishes probable cause to believe that testilying 
occurred, prosecution should be mandatory. In the federal system, Department of 
Justice policy already limits the discretion of prosecutors to decline prosecution in 
certain cases. States have also moved toward limiting prosecutorial discretion, notably 
in the area of domestic violence. Compulsory prosecution is also a common feature 
of regulatory agencies and European jurisdictions.”); Chin & Wells, supra note 89, at 
289 (proposing jury instructions on the blue wall of silence); Levine, supra note 10, 
at 755-56 (arguing for the appointment of special prosecutors and changes to the grand 
jury system). See also Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA 
L. REV. 1447, 1494 (2016). 
 93. See infra Section I.C. 
 94. See Chin & Wells, supra note 89, at 263 (“Prosecutors may be reluctant 
to prosecute police officers . . . . Most state prosecutors have relatively small 
investigative staffs; they depend on the police departments to investigate and prove 
their cases. Accordingly, a prosecutor sensitive to the need to maintain a good working 
relationship with the police department, and realizing that she cannot succeed in her 
job without police assistance, might reasonably hesitate to prosecute a police officer 
for a crime that would put a private citizen behind bars.”). 
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argument in detail in Part III.95 In the rare cases where prosecutors do 
bring charges, officers are often acquitted due in no small part 
to credibility assumptions that judges and jurors make in favor of 
police narratives. This is despite a well-documented problem of police 
perjury. These narratives often intersect with implicit biases and 
harmful stereotypes that work against prosecutors when pursuing 
charges against officers for acts of brutality against citizens of 
color. As Bennett Capers has argued, police brutality persists in part 
because officers know they can get away with misrepresenting the 
truth.96 If prosecutors respond more assertively, this sense of impunity 
will be diminished, and officer misconduct may decrease.97   
A. Police Perjury Is Common and Prosecutors Are—Knowingly or 
Unknowingly—Complicit98 
Routine police perjury is not a new feature of the American 
criminal system. In 1967, law professor, practitioner, and judge Irving 
Younger was lamenting police falsification of evidence as 
“commonplace.”99 By 1994, the Mollen Commission had concluded 
that police perjury is “widely tolerated by corrupt and honest officers 
                                                   
 95. See infra Part III. 
 96. See Capers, supra note 6, at 866 (“Police brutality persists, at least in part, 
because officers are aware that they can misrepresent the truth with impunity. And 
racial profiling thrives, at least in part, because officers know they can misrepresent 
their motives for conducting stops without consequences. This suggests that a 
reduction in testilying might have the collateral effect of contributing to a reduction 
in brutality and profiling.”). 
 97. See id. 
 98. The author acknowledges that some police departments may hide or 
refuse to share evidence of officer misconduct, including evidence suggesting perjury, 
from prosecutors. Id. at 870. This leaves prosecutors either entirely in the dark or, if 
suspicious of officer testimony, unable to confirm their suspicions sufficiently to take 
action beyond declining to call the officer as a witness. See id.; see also Jennifer 
Gonnerman, Larry Krasner’s Campaign to End Mass Incarceration, NEW YORKER 
(Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/ 
magazine/2018/10/29/larry-krasners-campaign-to-end-mass-incarceration 
[https://perma.cc/Q6HF-5SRW] (noting that even the District Attorney of 
Philadelphia has been unable to obtain information regarding officer complaints from 
the Internal Affairs Department). 
 99. See Irving Younger, The Perjury Routine, NATION, May 3, 1967, at 596-
97 (“Every lawyer who practices in the criminal courts knows that police perjury in 
commonplace”). For further discussion, see also Younger’s later opinion as judge in 
People v. McMurty, 314 N.Y.S.2d 194, 197 (Crim. Ct. 1970) (finding that police 
perjury exists “beyond any doubt”). 
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alike, as well as their supervisors,”100 and that police falsification—
defined as testimonial perjury, documentary perjury, or the 
falsification of police records—is one of the most common forms of 
police corruption.101 The practice of police perjury is so common that 
it spawned its own term: “testilying.”102 Interviews with prosecutors, 
defense attorneys, and judges reveal that police lies are so pervasive 
that even former prosecutors have described them as “commonplace” 
and “prevalent.”103 Recently, in New York City, journalists uncovered 
enough cases of probable testilying to conclude that the city has “an 
entrenched perjury problem.”104 New York is not alone.105 
                                                   
 100. See Chin & Wells, supra note 89, at 249 (quoting the Mollen 
Commission); MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 89, at 40. 
 101. See MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 89, at 39. 
 102. See Capers, supra note 6, at 836-37 (quoting the findings of the Mollen 
Commission). See also Nicholas Kristof, Was Kevin Cooper Framed for Murder?, 
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/17/opinion/sunday/kevin-
cooper-california-death-row.html [https://perma.cc/Z5D7-6SZY] (last visited Jan. 30, 
2019) (“The police are under great pressure to solve a sensational crime, they are sure 
they have the culprit, and when the evidence is lacking they plant it and give false 
testimony. This is called ‘testilying,’ and it’s more common than we’d like to think.”) 
 103. See Capers, supra note 6, at 870. 
 104. See Joseph Goldstein, ‘Testilying’ by Police: A Stubborn Problem, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/18/nyregion/testilying-
police-perjury-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/JWR2-M8JB] (finding that police 
lying persists despite increased use of video evidence); see also Donald A Dripps, 
Police, Plus Perjury, Equals Polygraphy, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 693, 699 
(1996) (reviewing the work of Richard Uviller who spent eight months observing a 
New York Police precinct and concluded that most police officers view police perjury 
as “natural and inevitable”). 
 105. See, e.g., Joseph A. Slobodzian & Mark Fazlollah, Philly Officer Gets 
Break on Perjury Charge, Agrees Not to Return to Force, INQUIRER (June 7, 2016), 
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/20160608_Philly_cop_gets_break_on_perjury_c
harge__agrees_not_to_return_to_force.html [https://perma.cc/Y8H7-NHDK]; Tony 
Hanson, Heroin Buyer Convicted Despite Testimony from Tainted Phila. Police 
Officer, CBS PHILLY (Aug. 22, 2014), https://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2014/08/22/ 
drug-conviction-comes-despite-testimony-from-tainted-phila-police-officer/ 
[http://perma.cc/Z42T-RXZM] (“When police officers admit to committing perjury 
and seem to have no fear that this district attorney’s office will prosecute them, it 
degrades the integrity of the entire criminal justice system.” (quoting Supervising 
Attorney Annie Fisher)); Dripps, supra note 104, at 700 (providing that interviews of 
judges, public defenders, and prosecutors in fourteen criminal courtrooms “outlined a 
pattern of pervasive police perjury intended to avoid the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment. Dishonesty occurs in both the investigative process and the courtroom. 
The respondents report systematic fabrication in case reports and affidavits for search 
warrants, creating artificial probable cause which forms the basis of later testimony. 
Moreover, police keep dual sets of investigatory files; official files and ‘street files.’ 
Exculpatory material in the street files may be edited from the official record”); 
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Two areas of police testimony seem to breed more perjured 
testimony than others: attempts to bolster claims of probable cause and 
attempts to avoid discipline or sanction for wrongdoing, particularly 
for excessive force claims.106 Police perjury notably increased after the 
Supreme Court decision creating the exclusionary rule in Mapp v. 
Ohio.107 In fact, a survey of police officers themselves revealed that 
76% agreed that officers shade the facts to establish probable cause, 
and that nearly half believed judges were correct when they rejected 
officer testimony.108 This is not a case of “a few bad apples”; it is a 
pervasive problem in American policing which has been known and 
largely ignored for decades.109 
                                                   
Radley Balko, Walter Scott’s Killer is Going to Prison. But His Case Is an Anomaly, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017), 
 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/12/08/walter-scotts-
killer-is-going-to-prison-but-his-case-is-an-anomaly/?utm_term=.a41ab0e71de0 
[https://perma.cc/R2PX-MDX4] (noting that in Los Angeles, “more than 300 sheriff’s 
deputies are on a secret misconduct list for offenses ranging from lying under oath 
to domestic violence to possible sexual assault. But thanks to union-negotiated rules, 
that list is kept secret from the public, from defense attorneys and even from 
prosecutors. Not only were the deputies on the list never criminally charged, they get 
to keep testifying before juries. They get to keep sending people to prison.”); Jacey 
Fortin, Baltimore Police Officer Charged with Fabricating Evidence in Drug Case, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/01/24/us/baltimore-officer-video-drugs.html [https://perma.cc/BE2T-SLBD]; 
Jacey Fortin, Baltimore Drops Dozens of Cases After Video Casts Doubt on Officers, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/ 
us/baltimore-drugs-police-dismissed.html [https://perma.cc/GQ6N-NNP5].  
 106. See Capers, supra note 6, at 866. Additionally, the use of body-cameras 
has recently documented more and more incidents of police planting false evidence, 
and many have noted the frequency of testilying in cases where officers plant false 
evidence or give false testimony in order to “solve” an outstanding crime. See Fortin, 
supra note 105.  
 107. See Capers, supra note 6, at 868 (noting the sharp rise in dropsy cases 
following Mapp once officers realized that telling the truth led to suppression of 
recovered evidence); see also People v. McMurty, 314 N.Y.S.2d 194, 197 (N.Y. Crim. 
Ct. 1970) (“So far as I know, there has been only one statistical study of ‘dropsy’ 
complaints . . .  It confirms my impressions: ‘In the period after Mapp, the number of 
complaints alleging that the suspect dropped the contraband increased for all groups 
of officers.’”) (quoting Sarah Barlow, Patterns of Arrests for Misdemeanor Narcotics 
Possession: Manhattan Police Practices 1960–62, 4 CRIM. L. BULL. 549, 556-57 
(1968)).  
 108. See Capers, supra note 6, at 870. 
 109. See MOLLEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 89, at 1-2 (finding that 
police supervisors instructed their officers how to lie so that evidence obtained in 
violation of the Constitution would not be suppressed); Chin & Wells, supra note 89, 
at 284 (“[C]ourts have taken divergent approaches to the admission of reports 
evincing the pervasive nature of the code of silence or conscious ignorance by police 
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Perjury and falsification to avoid disciplinary sanctions or 
criminal charges for police brutality are also common and typically 
involve offending officers claiming self-defense to justify their 
excessive use of force.110 Other officers either remain silent or support 
the officers’ self-defense claims.111 This phenomenon, referred to as 
                                                   
supervisors of their subordinates’ behavior.’”)); Capers, supra note 6, at 868 
(“Officers telling ‘white lies’-or what this Article terms ‘blue lies’-is nothing new. 
Indeed, blue lies have existed as long as there have been restraints on police 
activity . . . Nor is perjury any real secret. In the early 1970s the Knapp Commission 
investigated the NYPD and concluded that corruption was causing officers to testify 
falsely and prepare false investigative reports. Two decades later, the Mollen 
Commission was impaneled to study the same problem . . . The Commission found a 
litany of manufactured tales.”); See also Morgan Cloud, Judges, ‘Testilying,’ and the 
Constitution, 69 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA L. REV. 1341, 1347 (concluding that the 
avalanche of news reports of police falsification and misconduct in Philadelphia, Los 
Angeles, Atlanta, New Orleans, Detroit, Minneapolis, and other cities in 1995 “dispels 
any notion that police misconduct, including perjury, is just a problem in New York 
or Los Angeles, or any other single location. This is a national problem and has been 
for decades.”) For more recent studies and reports on the continued problem of police 
falsification see Vida B. Johnson, Bias in Blue: Instructing Jurors to Consider the 
Testimony of Police Officer Witness with Caution, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 245, 289-91 
(2017); Radley Balko, How Do We Fix the Police ‘Testilying’ Problem?, WASH. POST 
(April 16, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/04/16/ 
how-do-we-fix-the-police-testilying-problem/?utm_term=.c47190f9d041 
[https://perma.cc/NH29-EQ53] (noting that Irving Younger’s warning “that the 
criminal justice system was providing cops with ‘heavy incentives to lie in court’” 
primarily due to the Exclusionary Rule has been repeated “ad nauseam over the years 
by other judges, defense attorneys, conscientious police chiefs, numerous academics 
and law journal articles, and whistleblowers.”), and Michelle Alexander, Why Police 
Lie Under Oath, N. Y. TIMES, (Feb. 2, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/ 
opinion/sunday/why-police-officers-lie-under-oath.html [https://perma.cc/URS8-
LJ77] (quoting Peter Keane, former San Francisco Police commissioner: “Police 
officer perjury in court to justify illegal dope searches is commonplace. One of the 
dirty little not-so-secret secrets of the criminal justice system is undercover narcotics 
officers intentionally lying under oath. It is a perversion of the American justice 
system that strikes directly at the rule of law. Yet it is the routine way of doing 
business in courtrooms everywhere in America[,]” and Justice Gustin L. Reichbach 
of the New York State Supreme Court: “even this court was shocked, not only by the 
seeming pervasive scope of misconduct but even more distressingly by the seeming 
casualness by which such conduct is employed.”). 
 110. See Chin & Wells, supra note 89, at 254-55. (“As a consequence of the 
code of silence, in cases involving allegations of police misconduct, such as excessive 
force or brutality, courts may hear boilerplate testimony by police to conceal or justify 
their malfeasance or that of a fellow officer . . . Although this type of police perjury 
is similar to dropsy testilying, it represents a more blatant variety of perjury, through 
which officers embrace outrights lies, manufacture evidence, and falsify documents 
to conceal police abuses or corruption in various forms.”). 
 111. Chin & Wells, supra note 89, at 237 (“Police officers . . . lie under oath 
because of the ‘blue wall of silence,’ an unwritten code in many departments which 
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the “blue wall of silence,” has been decried as “the greatest single 
barrier to the effective investigation and adjudication of complaints” 
against police departments.112 Defense attorneys are well-versed with 
cases in which clients are charged with resisting arrest or assaulting an 
officer, yet the clients are the only ones with injuries. This has led 
practitioners and scholars to refer to those types of charges as “cover 
charges.”113  
A recent, high-profile example of a cover charge case is the 
incident involving Sterling Brown, an African–American NBA player, 
who was arrested in Milwaukee for resisting or obstructing an 
officer.114 Officers stopped Brown to issue a parking citation, then 
                                                   
prohibits . . . testifying truthfully if the facts would implicate the conduct of a fellow 
officer.”); Levine, supra note 10, at 749 (defining the “blue wall of silence,” as when 
“police either refuse to testify against one another or collude to present their stories in 
the least criminal light.”). 
 112. See Chin &Wells, supra note 89, at 240 (quoting the 1991 Report of the 
Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department—appointed in 
response to the beating of Rodney King—which found that loyalty obligations and 
fear of retaliation in police departments served to enforce the officer code of silence). 
See generally Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the 
Prosecuting Attorney, 55 GEO. L.J. 1030 (1967).  
 113. See Johnson, supra note 109, at 282 (noting some indications of cover 
charges include when a criminal defendant is charged only with that offense, and no 
underlying offense justifying the initial interaction by police). An example of cover 
charges from the author’s own criminal defense clinic: A student represented a woman 
who was charged with resisting arrest after an officer put her head through a wall 
because she wanted to be present while her minor child was being arrested. The officer 
put in his police report that this use of force was required because she had unlawfully 
“entered his personal space.” The officer neglected to include the fact that he put her 
head through a wall and that she was subsequently taken to the hospital by a relative 
after the incident, all of which was documented by the family and provided to the 
prosecution. In this particular case the prosecutor dismissed the charges, but notably 
no actions were taken against the officer. The fact that the officer had charged only 
resisting arrest, with no other offense that could have justified the arrest in the first 
place, makes this a typical “cover charge” case.  
 114. See Nick Bohr, Arrest Report: ‘Brown Physically Resisted Officers 
Attempt to Handcuff Him’, ABC NEWS WISC. (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.wisn.com/ 
article/arrest-report-brown-physically-resisted-officers-attempts-to-handcuff-
him/16752938 [https://perma.cc/92KY-KB4T] (describing the arrest report calling 
Brown “very aggressive” and explaining “Brown physically resisted officers attempts 
to handcuff him and he was taken to the ground in a controlled manner” where he 
continued to “resist being handcuffed” and “a [t]aser had to be employed.”); see also 
Ivan Moreno, Bucks’ Sterling Brown Sues Milwaukee over Stun-Gun Arrest for 
Parking Violation, CHI. TRIB. (June 19, 2018), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/basketball/ct-spt-sterling-brown-sues-police-
arrest-20180619-story.html [https://perma.cc/X436-GAS3] (“The lawsuit alleges 
officers involved in his arrest used their incident report to try to reframe what 
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slammed him to the ground and repeatedly tased him.115 The police 
report states that Brown resisted arrest and was aggressive toward the 
officers, yet video of the incident does not support that description, 
and prosecutors declined to pursue charges against Brown.116 Brown 
alleges that the officers discussed the incident shortly after it happened 
to get their stories straight.117 This sequence of events—police 
brutality, arrest on fabricated charges, and falsification of the police 
report—is a familiar pattern in these types of cases.  
B. Prosecutors Rarely Allege Officer Misconduct Because They Rely 
on Police Officers as Witnesses 
Prosecutors have several options for dealing with suspected or 
confirmed cases of officer fabrication: they can bring perjury charges 
or refer officers who falsify evidence or testimony to Internal 
Affairs.118 They can, and arguably should, share the information with 
defense attorneys as Brady material.119 They can dismiss cases or 
                                                   
happened to give the impression Brown was resisted and obstructed them. . . . Brown 
never appeared to threaten police before or during his arrest, according to police body-
camera videos.”). 
 115. See Moreno, supra note 114. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. (noting that the bodycam footage supports Brown’s claim, as the 
officers can be heard discussing “protecting themselves” and the likelihood of a media 
firestorm). Similarly, video footage after the shooting death of Stephon Clark in 
Sacramento shows officers muting their body-cameras at least sixteen times, leading 
some to speculate they were discussing how best to limit their exposure to discipline 
or criminal liability. See Alex Horton, After Stephon Clark’s Death, New Videos Show 
Police Muted Body Cameras at Least 16 Times, WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 2018, 5:33 
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/04/17/after-
stephon-clarks-death-new-videos-show-more-muted-police-body-cameras-delays-to-
render-aid/?utm_term=.7d2b4e493e99 [https://perma.cc/3WW2-UVX4]. 
 118. According to the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards: 
While the decision to arrest is often the responsibility of law enforcement 
personnel, the decision to institute formal criminal proceedings is the 
responsibility of the prosecutor. Where the law permits a law enforcement 
officer or other person to initiate proceedings by complaining directly to a 
judicial officer or the grand jury, the complainant should be required to 
present the complaint for prior review by the prosecutor, and the 
prosecutor’s recommendation regarding the complaint should be 
communicated to the judicial officer or grand jury.  
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-4.2(a) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2015). 
 119. See Taylor Pendergrass, How Bad Prosecutors Cause Bad Policing: 
Prosecuting Abusive Cops is the Least That District Attorneys Can Do, SLATE (Aug. 
16, 2016, 2:09 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2016/08/how-bad-
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decline to call police officers where they suspect that officers have or 
will falsify testimony or evidence.120 Chief prosecutors in particular 
can mandate that line prosecutors report police misconduct and can 
provide protected channels for those reports.121  
Unfortunately, prosecutors rarely exercise these options.122 
When they do, they tend only to decline calling the suspect officer as 
a witness.123 This of course does little to change behavior or deter 
falsification and contributes to the overall culture of impunity 
surrounding police misconduct.124 Thus, police perjury may be 
tolerated, or even encouraged, by prosecutors at each step in the 
process in both direct and indirect ways.125 A major reason for this 
tolerance is the degree to which prosecutors depend on police officers 
to investigate criminal activity, provide evidence, and testify at 
motions and trials. State prosecutors generally do not direct the actions 
                                                   
prosecutors-cause-bad-policing.html [https://perma.cc/BV9Q-VQVL]. But see 
Jonathan Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot: Impeachment Evidence in Police Personnel Files 
and the Battle Splitting the Prosecution Team, 67 STAN. L. REV. 743, 743 (2015) 
(arguing that prosecutors themselves are often precluded from obtaining or disclosing 
the contents of police personnel files by statute, local rule, and police policy and union 
action); Gonnerman, supra note 98 (chronicling the difficulty that even the District 
Attorney of Philadelphia has had in obtaining information from IAD regarding officer 
complaints).  
 120. See Pendergrass, supra note 119; see also CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS 
FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). The Prosecutor’s 
Heightened Duty of Candor states that “the prosecutor should not make a statement 
of fact or law, or offer evidence that the prosecutor does not reasonably believe to be 
true,” and establishes a continuing duty to correct any other representations made by 
other prosecutors that one later learns to be or reasonably believes to be false. 
 121. See Pendergrass, supra note 119. 
 122. See Michael Bloch, When Cops Lie Under Oath, Prosecutors Must Take 
Some Blame, USA TODAY (Feb. 22, 2018, 7:01 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/opinion/policing/2018/02/22/when-cops-lie-under-oath-prosecutors-must-take-
some-blame/360414002/ [https://perma.cc/YMG3-63N6] (noting that prosecutors 
often seek to conceal records of prior police misconduct from defense attorneys and 
the Court and rarely dismiss cases based on disbelief of officer testimony). 
 123. In Philadelphia, this practice created what became known as the “do not 
call” list. See Alicia Victoria Lozano, 29 Problem Police Named in Philadelphia 
District Attorney’s ‘Do Not Call’ List, NBC PHILA. (Mar. 7, 2018),  
https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/29-Problem-Cops-Named-in-
Philadelphia-District-Attorneys-Do-Not-Call-List-476133573.html 
[https://perma.cc/28WL-G9VZ] (describing the list as an “internal guide to determine 
when a potentially tainted officer’s testimony could be used,” and listing offenses of 
the former and current officers on the list as including “lying to police investigators, 
filing false police reports, use of excessive force . . . among other issues.”).  
 124. See Capers, supra note 6, at 866.  
 125. See id. at 850. 
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or investigations of police departments. This makes them dependent 
on the cooperation of officers to make out their cases126 and creates a 
vested interest in “maintaining smooth working relations with police, 
who gather the government’s evidence and are often its most 
important witnesses at trial.”127 This dependency dramatically 
decreases the degree to which prosecutors are willing to reject officer 
testimony, pursue misconduct claims against officers, or challenge 
police narratives.128  
The problem is exacerbated by an overreliance on police 
narratives by the prosecutors who are least equipped to challenge 
them. Misdemeanor court is a common starting ground for newer 
prosecutors. It is also the place where many cases are litigated without 
any civilian witnesses or complainants.129 This means it is most often 
newer prosecutors who are heavily or entirely reliant on officer 
testimony to prosecute their cases and who are regularly handling 
cases in which the only question for the court is the officer’s 
credibility. More experienced prosecutors are more likely to be 
handling more serious cases—robberies, assaults, sexual offenses—
that tend to involve more civilian complainants and witnesses. Thus, 
the people most likely to be put in the position of having to question 
the testimony of an officer are often the people least equipped to do 
so.  
In cases where officer credibility is the only issue for the court, 
a defense attorney has no option but to attack the truthfulness of the 
                                                   
 126. See David A. Harris, The Interaction and Relationship Between 
Prosecutors and Police Officers in the U.S., and How This Affects Police Reform 
Efforts 2-3 (Univ. Pitt. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working 
Paper No. 2011-19, 2011). See generally ERIK LUNA & MARIANNE L. WADE, THE 
PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2012). 
 127. Jay Sterling Silver, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: The Case 
Against the Client Perjury Rules, 47 VAND. L. REV. 339, 358 n.75 (1994). 
 128. See Capers, supra note 6, at 874. Capers sums up the relationship as 
follows: “Prosecutors need cases. Officers make cases. A priori, prosecutors need 
officers.” See also Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their 
Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 792 (2003) (“[O]ne ought not underestimate 
the unifying influence of a shared commitment to ‘getting the bad guys,’ hardened by 
the adversarial process, nurtured by mutual respect and need, and on occasion 
lubricated by alcohol.”). 
 129. Common misdemeanor cases include charges such as drug possession, 
resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, prostitution, criminal mischief, and—in some 
jurisdictions—traffic offenses. Most of these cases involve only police witnesses, thus 
making the prosecutors entirely dependent on police testimony to prove the elements 
of the offense. 
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officer’s statement. 130 For example, if the officer’s testimony is that 
she recovered illegal drugs from the defendant’s pocket, the defense 
must argue that either the officer is mistaken, or she is lying. If the 
officer is telling the truth, the defendant is guilty. Once the officer’s 
credibility is attacked, the prosecutor—if he still intends to win the 
case—is then in the position of defending the officer’s story. The 
prosecutor may point to the physical evidence that supports the 
officer’s testimony. He may also argue motive and assert that, because 
the officer does not know the defendant, she cannot have any bias 
toward him and therefore the factfinder can assume that she is telling 
the truth.131 This line of argument plays on the disinclination of judges 
to call police officers liars and the natural inclination of most 
Americans to believe the police.132 It also demands that any motive 
behind police violence be personal and arise out of animus toward the 
defendant as an individual, despite the large role implicit bias can play 
in policing decisions.133  
C. Police Claims of Self-Defense to Justify Deadly Force Implicate 
Narratives of Black Criminality and Dangerousness 
Concerns about police falsification and the ways in which 
prosecutor complicity contributes to the degradation of the legitimacy 
of the justice system are heightened in cases involving minority 
victims of police abuse because of the historical legacy of racially 
discriminatory policing.134 The dehumanization of people of color in 
the United States, first used to justify and enable slavery and later to 
                                                   
 130. Note, the decision to go to trial lays solely with the defendant, not the 
defense attorney. Because of the duty to zealously represent one’s client, a defense 
attorney in a trial on those allegations would have to argue either mistake or 
falsification.  
 131. See discussion of State v. Stockley, No. 166-CR02213-01, slip op. at x 
(22d Jud. Cir. Ct. Sept. 15, 2017) infra Section II.D (discussing the judge’s conclusion 
that the lack of a preexisting relationship between the parties precluded any possibility 
of motive). 
 132. See Capers, supra note 6, at 875 n.214 (“Judges are often reluctant to 
make adverse credibility determinations against an officer ‘on the record.’ Instead, 
judges tend to grant suppression motions on the ‘more acceptable’ ground that, even 
crediting the officer’s testimony, the evidence was insufficient to establish reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause.”); see also Chin & Wells, supra note 89, at 246 (stating 
that jurors interviewed after police credibility trials will often say things like, “we just 
couldn’t think of any reason why the police officers would go to the trouble of making 
up a story and framing someone.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 133. See infra Section II.C. 
 134. See Lee & Ifill, supra note 7, at 255-56.  
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rationalize the disparate treatment of African Americans under Jim 
Crow, has created deep-seated associations of race and dangerousness 
in the American psyche.135 While overt racism certainly persists today 
and in fact appears to be increasing,136 still more common are the 
implicit biases, stereotypes, and assumptions that shape decision-
making, often unwittingly.137 Neurologically, racially coded categories 
create neural pathways that become entrenched over time, ultimately 
encouraging “rapid unconscious thinking that has the effect of 
hardwiring stereotypes into the pathways of the brain.”138 The more 
one is exposed to these narratives, the more strengthened the neural 
synapse circuits associated with these stories become, eventually 
becoming a permanent part of the brain’s structure.139 These 
                                                   
 135. Id. at 260. (“At the heart of this discrimination is the automatic 
association between ‘blackness’ and criminality that is the product of the longstanding 
dehumanization of black people throughout American history”); see also Brent 
Staples, The Racist Trope that Won’t Die, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/17/opinion/roseanne-racism-blacks-apes.html 
[https://perma.cc/A54A-V76Q] (citing the work of Jennifer Eberhardt and Phillip 
Atiba Goff and arguing that “[t]his process of dehumanization often leads Americans 
to view African–American men as larger and more fearsome than they are”). 
Dehumanizing rhetoric and faux science have been used throughout history against 
countless groups to inspire animus and violence—by early white settlers against 
American Indians to justify cultural genocide, by the Nazi party against European 
Jews, and now by the United States government against Latinx migrants. The 
dehumanization of Native Americans and Latinxs have had similar impacts on the 
ways in which these communities are policed. This Article focuses primarily on 
stereotypes of black criminality in order to engage with some of the specifics of the 
narratives. 
 136. The FBI 2016 annual Hate Crime Statistics found that hate crimes rose 
nearly 5% in 2016. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: HATE 
CRIME STATISTICS, 2016 (2017). There were 5,850 hate crimes reported in 2015 and 
6,121 reported in 2016. Id. More than 50% of those crimes are directed against African 
Americans. Id. The 2017 Report showed law enforcement reporting 7,175 hate crimes 
to the Uniform Crime Reporting Program, an increase of approximately 17% from 
2016. Approximately 5,000 of those crimes were categorized as crimes against 
persons, and just under 60% were categorized as incidents involving 
race/ethnicity/ancestry bias. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: 
HATE CRIME STATISTICS, 2017 (2018).  
 137. See Chris Mooney, The Science of Why Cops Shoot Young Black Men, 
MOTHER JONES (Dec. 1, 2014, 11:00 AM), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/ 
2014/12/science-of-racism-prejudice/ [https://perma.cc/3X38-QGQZ]. 
 138. Lucy Jewel, Neurorhetoric, Race, and the Law: Toxic Neural Pathways 
and Healing Alternatives, 76 MD. L. REV. 663, 664 (2017) (“Neuroscience explains 
why and how racially coded categories are so efficient: they create neural pathways 
that, upon continued use, become collectively entrenched.”). 
 139. Id. at 674 (“Repeated exposure to certain forms of narrative rhetoric 
causes the neural synapse circuits associated with these stories to become so strong 
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stereotypes are prevalent in the media, which regularly, and often 
exclusively, depicts people of color as dangerous criminals.140  
Police officers, like most Americans, exhibit common implicit 
biases about African–American males.141 Americans typically view 
men and boys of color as inherently more dangerous and their 
behavior more criminal than white men and boys.142 While these 
assumptions are not unique to the police, they are more likely to 
manifest in the types of split-second decisions made by police officers 
encountering someone they have identified as a suspect.143 Prosecutors 
may share these implicit biases and be influenced by them when 
pursuing charges against defendants of color. The more stories 
invoking these narratives are told, the more embedded in the national 
psyche they become. It is in this way that individuals’ have become 
primed to receive and believe the narratives of police officers who 
claim self-defense after killing black men. 
                                                   
that they form a permanent part of the brain’s structure. In this way, deep narratives 
become implanted.”). 
 140. In the context of crime coverage, there is considerable evidence that 
media primarily and often exclusively portray black and Latinx Americans as violent 
criminals. See Entman & Gross, supra note 91, at 97.  
 141. See Mooney, supra note 137. Implicit bias “refers to attitudes and beliefs 
that individuals do not consciously control.” Katheryn Russell-Brown, Making 
Implicit Bias Explicit: Black Men and the Police, in POLICING THE BLACK MAN 138 
(Angela J. Davis ed., 2017) (citing various studies showing bidirectional links 
between perceptions of criminality and blackness and identifying three major themes 
from the research: police respond in a racially biased way toward black targets, police 
shoot more quickly at a black armed target than a white armed target, and police are 
more likely to mistakenly believe that a black target is armed than that a white target 
is). 
 142. See id. at 144 (noting study by Joshua Correll using video game 
simulation to test responses to shooter simulations which showed that civilians were 
more likely than officers to shoot unarmed black targets and more likely overall to 
shoot black targets than white targets). Notably, research shows that police officers, 
as a whole, display less implicit bias toward suspect of color than the average 
American civilian. Id. at 145 (“The community members were more likely than the 
officers to shoot unarmed black targets. The researchers also found that community 
members were overall more likely to shoot black targets than white targets.”)  
 143. Lee & Ifill, supra note 7, at 278 (“These automatic, yet baseless, 
associations between race and dangerousness—derived from generations of false and 
dehumanizing stereotypes of blackness—are even more likely to occur when making 
the type of ‘split-second judgments’ that the Supreme Court acknowledged were 
common for police officers.”). 
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D. Pro-Police Narratives Hurt Prosecutors When Prosecuting Police 
Despite the frequency of police perjury,144 the interplay of 
neuroscience and unchallenged stock narratives continue to result in 
deference to police testimony.145 Stock narratives of black criminality 
and the inherent dangerousness of black men prime fact finders to 
believe the types of self-defense narratives often told by police in 
cases where they have shot and killed victims of color. These 
narratives are compounded by many routine prosecutorial practices. 
The conviction-motivated mindset of prosecuting offices encourages 
the practice of overcharging defendants, which fuels higher rates of 
guilty pleas and fewer litigated suppression motions.146 People of 
color, and particularly indigent people of color, are vastly 
overrepresented in the American criminal system in comparison to 
their white peers, who exhibit similar offense rates for most crimes.147 
                                                   
 144. It is important to note that while much of the public is unaware of the 
frequency of police perjury because of the failure to address it; poor communities of 
color have lived with its consequences for decades. Chin & Wells, supra note 89, at 
249-50 (“The defendant knows that the police lied. The defendant’s friends, family 
and neighbors may well believe him when he says ‘I did it, but the police lied on me.’ 
Seeing members of one’s community sent to prison based on solemn lies undermines 
belief in the very legitimacy of the law.”). 
 145. Lucy Jewel describes this as follows: “In any criminal proceeding, a 
simple reference that a legal actor is a black male with a firearm is likely to trigger 
deep-seated neural pathways related to fear.” Jewel, supra note 138, at 681. If the fact 
finder him or herself is experiencing fear, it makes it much easier to believe it 
reasonable that the defendant was likewise fearful—even if fear would be an 
objectively unreasonable reaction under the circumstances. 
 146. See generally JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF 
INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017) (noting increased rates 
of felony charges fueling mass incarceration). Kate Levine and the work of Josh 
Bowers identify the charging decision as among the most important made by 
prosecutors. E.g., Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable 
Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1709 (2010) (“[P]rosecutors’ 
initial decisions of what and whether to charge are somewhat dispositive on the 
question of whether the defendant will ultimately end up with some type of 
conviction . . . .”). 
 147. See generally NATAPOFF, supra note 71 (noting that offending and arrest 
rates among citizens are particularly disparate in the misdemeanor system); See also 
ALEXANDER, note 71; Capers, supra note 6, at 850 (“The Maryland Report found that 
the hit rates for blacks who had been stopped and searched was in fact statistically 
identical to the hit rates for whites who had been stopped and searched: the hit rate for 
when officers searched black motorists was 28.4%; the hit rate when officers searched 
white motorists was 28.8%. The results of a study conducted by the New Jersey State 
Police in 2000 are even starker. The New Jersey study found that blacks and Hispanics 
comprised seventy-eight percent of the motorists stopped and searched. In terms of 
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This is generally attributed to the over-policing of people of color, 
particularly in the implementation of police practices such as stop and 
frisk. 148 Despite the fact that stop-and-frisk practices yield incredibly 
low success rates for contraband, judges see only the small fraction of 
cases in which contraband is found.149 Because most of these cases are 
resolved by way of guilty plea, judges then see defendants who may 
in fact be innocent or have viable suppression motions150 pleading 
guilty.151 Not only does this process obscure wrongdoing by police,152 
it also perpetuates a belief among fact finders that police narratives are 
inherently reliable. Prosecutors play into this belief when they attest 
to officer credibility in suppression motions and trials. In so doing, 
prosecutors may—intentionally or not—perpetuate the pro-police 
narratives that discredit narratives of people of color and ultimately 
disadvantage prosecutors when trying to convict a police officer in a 
cross-racial shooting.153 These dynamics can be seen in the case of 
Jason Stockley, a St. Louis police officer who was charged with first-
                                                   
hit rates, the troopers found evidence of criminal activity in thirteen percent of their 
searches of black motorists, and in five percent of their searches of Hispanic motorists. 
By contrast, when officers searched white motorists, they found evidence of criminal 
activity twenty-five percent of the time. Similar studies in other jurisdictions have 
produced similar data.”). 
 148. See K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Duty to Seek 
Justice in an Overburdened Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 285, 
297 (2014); Capers, supra note 6, at 851 (“For example, NYPD citywide stop and 
frisk data between 1998 and 2000 revealed that eighty-four percent of the individuals 
stopped and frisked in New York City were black or Hispanic. Between 1997 and 
1998, NYPD’s elite street crime unit conducted nearly 40,000 frisks that revealed no 
contraband at all.”).  
 149. See Howell, supra note 148, at 297; Capers, supra note 6, at 851, 880; 
see also Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(discussing the stark racial disparities and low success rates that characterize stop and 
frisk policing); Tim Lynch, The Devil’s Bargain: How Plea Agreements, Never 
Contemplated by the Framers, Undermine Justice, CATO INST. (July 2011), 
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/devils-bargain-how-plea-
agreements-never-contemplated-framers-undermine-justice [https://perma.cc/8G7K-
D5R8]. 
 150. See Howell, supra note 148, at 292. 
 151. For a truly demoralizing description of how the criminal system extracts 
guilty pleas from innocent people and the ways in which people of color are 
particularly vulnerable to these injustices, see NATAPOFF, supra note 71, at 87-111. 
 152. See Lynch, supra note 149.  
 153. Adamson, supra note 91, at 5 (“Overall, the inherent text and subtext of 
crime news perpetuates skepticism toward Black narratives and legitimacy toward 
majoritarian, law enforcement orthodoxies. Those racialized narratives have been 
shown to have adverse impacts upon jurors and defendants.”).  
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degree murder in the spring of 2016 for shooting and killing Anthony 
Lamar Smith.154  
The incident occurred on December 20, 2011, after Stockley and 
his partner engaged in a high-speed chase of Smith’s car.155 During the 
pursuit, Stockley fired at the car multiple times and was recorded 
saying, “We’re killing this motherfucker, don’t you know.”156 His 
partner rammed Smith’s car to end the chase.157 Stockley then 
approached Smith’s window and fired five times, killing Smith. A gun 
was recovered from Smith’s glove compartment, which the prosecutor 
submitted Stockley had planted to bolster his self-defense claim. 
Supporting the prosecutor’s argument was the fact that the only DNA 
recovered from the gun belonged to Stockley. Nonetheless, Stockley 
was acquitted. The judge who presided over the bench trial released 
an opinion supporting his verdict, making the case a unique 
opportunity to see how prosecutor complicity with police perjury 
works against the state in police prosecutions. 
The judge’s opinion echoed many of the kinds of pro-police 
arguments regularly used by prosecutors in cases where defense 
attorneys challenge the credibility of the testifying officer. First, the 
judge noted that there was no preexisting relationship between 
Stockley and Smith, meaning that there was no motive for Stockley to 
kill Smith.158 The question of motive is certainly relevant in a homicide 
but by requiring that animus be both overt and personal, the judge 
ignores the reality of how implicit bias shapes and informs police 
decision-making.159  
Second, the judge concluded that the firearm recovered from the 
glove compartment belonged to the victim, Anthony Lamar Smith, 
noting that “an urban heroin dealer not in possession of a firearm 
would be an anomaly.”160 The judge specified that this is based on what 
                                                   
 154. See Complaint at 1, State v. Stockley (22d Jud. Cir. Ct. Sept. 15, 2017) 
(No. 166-CR02213-01).  
 155. See id. at 2. 
 156. See id.at 5. 
 157. See id. 
 158. State v. Stockley, No. 166-CR02213-01, slip op. at 20-21 (22d Jud. Cir. 
Ct. Sept. 15, 2017) (“The Court believes it is significant that defendant Stockley and 
Smith did not know each other prior to December 20, 2011, they had no prior history, 
there was no history between Stockley and members of Smith’s family, and there was 
no basis in the evidence to suggest any pre-existing animosity by Stockley toward 
Smith.”). 
 159. See generally L. Song Richardson, Police Racial Violence: Lessons from 
Social Psychology, 83 FORDHAM. L. REV. 2961 (2015). 
 160. Stockley, slip op. at 26 (22nd Jud. Cir. Ct. Sept. 15, 2017).  
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he has learned presiding over criminal trials—in other words, what he 
has previously heard in police testimony.161 His thirty years on the 
bench have doubtless offered a myriad of opportunities to listen to 
police officers testify at trials about “urban heroin dealers” and their 
practices and to oversee countless guilty pleas from such defendants.162 
The perception of criminal activity for many judges is shaped by what 
they see in their courtrooms: defendants of color pleading guilty, 
allowing judges to conclude that the police were right to stop them. 
The true numbers, however, tell a wholly different story.163 The 
judge’s reliance on past courtroom experience to conclude that Smith 
was an “urban heroin dealer” and must have possessed a firearm thus 
raises concerns of confirmation bias. 164 
                                                   
 161. Id. slip. op. at 26. (“Finally, the Court observes, based on its nearly thirty 
years on the bench, that an urban heroin dealer not in possession of a firearm would 
be an anomaly.”) The notion that “guns follow drugs” is fairly pervasive in the 
criminal justice system and has been for some time. See JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING 
UP OUR OWN 165 (2017) (noting D.C. Mayor Marion Barry’s tendency to use the 
phrase “gun thugs and drug thugs” to justify harsher police tactics). This automatic 
presumption that guns follow drugs was specifically disallowed by the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Grahame, 7 A.3d 810, 811 (Pa. 2010) (holding 
that the Superior Court erred in adopting a “guns follow drugs” presumption in order 
to justify a protective search for weapons simply because drug activity was present). 
 162. Here we see how the typical prosecutorial function in the retributive 
system—pleading out cases regardless of constitutional violations, officer 
falsification, or actual innocence—can create a confirmation bias for factfinders. See 
Howell, supra note 148, at 295-96; see also Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 
2d 540, 556, 558-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Lynch, supra note 149. 
 163. See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 556, 558-59 (finding that of the 4.4 million 
stops made by the NYCPD between 2004 and 2012, over 80% were of African–
American or Hispanic individuals; in 98.5% of the 2.3 million frisks for weapons, no 
weapon was found; in 86% of searches, no contraband was found; and in 88% of stops 
overall, no arrest or other law enforcement action resulted). Capers, supra note 6, at 
851 (“For example, NYPD citywide stop and frisk data between 1998 and 2000 
revealed that eighty-four percent of the individuals stopped and frisked in New York 
City were black or Hispanic. Between 1997 and 1998, NYPD’s elite street crime unit 
conducted nearly 40,000 frisks that revealed no contraband at all.”);  See also, Marc 
Mauer, The Endurance of Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System, in 
POLICING THE BLACK MAN 42 (discussing data from New Jersey, Maryland and 
Florida showing that black motorists were stopped far more often than other motorists 
and that “hit rates” resulting from searches failed to show that black drivers were more 
likely to be carrying contraband than any other drivers, as well as discussing New 
York’s data showing that, while black and Latinx New Yorkers were more likely to 
be frisked during a pedestrian stop, they were only half as likely to be found in 
possession of an illegal weapon, and that of the 191,000 stops in 2013 in New York, 
guns were found in less than 1% of all cases). 
 164. According to the judge’s opinion, a bag of heroin was recovered from the 
vehicle that Smith was driving, which had Mr. Smith’s DNA on it. The other occupant 
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Third, the judge found that the defendant’s testimony needed no 
corroboration to be believed.165 This unusual statement seems 
emblematic of the double standard for police defendants—particularly 
the heightened presumption of innocence.166 Generally, a defendant’s 
testimony raises questions because of his or her self-interest in 
avoiding a conviction.167 In this case, Stockley had a clear motive to 
fabricate a claim of self-defense: If he was not acting in self-defense, 
he was guilty of homicide. The judge, in ignoring this obvious 
motivation, seemed to bend over backwards to award credibility 
points to a police officer, reflecting the common prosecutor argument 
that police credibility is unassailable.168 It seems impossible to 
envision the same presumption of credibility being given to a non-
officer defendant like the victim, an “urban heroin dealer,” had he 
been the one on trial.  
This acquittal was perceived as a failure to deliver justice to the 
victim, his family, and the community, undermining their sense of the 
                                                   
of the vehicle, Mr. Taylor, testified that he was unaware that heroin was in the car. 
The judge found his testimony not credible. Stockley, slip op. at 11. The judge does 
not mention any evidence that Mr. Smith was engaged in drug dealing other than 
Stockley’s testimony that Mr. Smith was engaged in “suspicious activity” and was 
involved in a “perceived drug transaction.” Stockley, slip op. at 14. The judge 
excluded proffered evidence that Anthony Smith had prior felony convictions. Thus, 
his conclusion that Mr. Smith was an “urban heroin dealer” appears to be based solely 
on the presence of heroin and the statement by Jason Stockley that he observed Mr. 
Smith in an alleged drug transaction. This conclusion raises additional concerns of 
victim-blaming that are often present in these cases. 
 165. See Stockley, slip op. at 26. 
 166. Lee & Ifill, supra note 8, at 279-80. 
 167. See Johnson, supra note 109, at 249 (noting that in most jurisdictions, 
when a criminal defendant testifies, the jurors are instructed that because he or she 
has a “vital” interest in the outcome the jurors may afford the testimony less weight). 
This jury instruction has been criticized for conflicting with the presumption of 
innocence, and it is not the intention of this author to argue in its favor. Rather, it is 
included to note just how surprising it is for the judge in this matter to find that the 
defendant’s testimony was so inherently trustworthy that he drew no conclusions from 
the failure of his partner to testify. 
 168. See id. at 257. This desire to protect the reputation of police officers’ 
testimony as credible goes back decades. See id. (citing Bush v. United States, 375 
F.2d 602, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1967)) (noting that courts have long been resistant to give 
jury instructions indicating that police officers may be motivated to lie in the 
prosecution’s favor, culminating in the decision in Bush v. United States which found 
that “it would be a dismal reflection on society to say that when the guardians of its 
security are called to testify in court under oath their testimony must be viewed with 
suspicion”). 
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law’s legitimacy.169 It permitted Stockley to persist in his state of 
denial, stating in a post-trial interview, “I know everyone wants 
someone to blame, but I’m just not the guy.”170 This statement is 
remarkably similar to that made by former Tulsa police officer Betty 
Shelby after her acquittal for the shooting death of Terence Crutcher: 
“I did everything I could to stop this . . . Crutcher’s death is his 
fault.”171 Both officers claimed self-defense during their trials despite, 
in Shelby’s case, the victim indisputably being unarmed and posing 
no immediate threat.172 This continued denial should not be surprising. 
For these officers, legal and societal acceptance of their self-defense 
claim validates their belief—whether conscious or unconscious—that 
the black man they killed was inherently dangerous, allowing them to 
eschew not only legal but also moral wrongdoing. It sends the same 
message to the public.173 
                                                   
 169. Following Jason Stockley’s acquittal, Anthony Lamar Smith’s brother 
was interviewed and asked what he thought of the verdict. His answer: “These laws 
are not made for us. They not. They made for y’all. Ten years from now all the little 
kids. . . they going to be saying I want to grow up to be a police—I can kill a black 
person and I’m gonna get away with it.” See Taryn Finley, Anthony Lamar Smith’s 
Brother: The Justice System Doesn’t Care About Us, HUFFPOST (Sept. 15, 2017), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/anthony-lamar-smith-brother-st-
louis_us_59bc1740e4b0edff971bdab1 [http://perma.cc/P6Q4-GCBE]. At the same 
time, there were protests on the streets of St. Louis, during which police officers in 
riot gear could be heard chanting, “Whose streets? Our streets!” at demonstrators. See 
AJ Willingham, How the Iconic ‘Whose Streets? Our Streets!’ Chant Has Been Co-
Opted, CCN (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/19/us/whose-streets-
our-streets-chant-trnd/index.html [http://perma.cc/7HD6-B925]; see also Vida B. 
Johnson, Prosecutors Who Police The Police Are Good People, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 
ONLINE 13, 16 (2018) (“The failure to police the police undermines the community’s 
trust in law enforcement and other criminal justice institutions, especially in light of 
the vigor with which prosecutors prosecute the most vulnerable in our society.”). 
 170. Protesters Take to the Streets in St. Louis in Response to Officer Jason 
Stockley Being Found Not Guilty of the Murder of Anthony Lamar Smith, CNN (Sept. 
15, 2017), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1709/15/cnnt.01.html 
[https://perma.cc/GEN8-HVQJ]. When asked why he agreed to be interviewed about 
the incident, Stockley replied, “Because I didn’t do anything wrong.”  Christina M. 
Fletes, Video: Exclusive Interview with Jason Stockley after His Acquittal, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/video-
exclusive-interview-with-jason-stockley-after-his-acquittal/html_1848b1cd-30bd-
5567-995c-bd26e9e66a29.html  [http://perma.cc/8BKX-XPYG] 
 171. Erik Ortiz & Phil Helsel, Jury Acquits Tulsa Officer Betty Shelby in 
Shooting Death of Terence Crutcher, NBC NEWS (May 18, 2017), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/jury-acquits-tulsa-officer-shooting-death-
terence-crutcher-n761206 [http://perma.cc/R7TQ-HSM2]. 
 172. See id. 
 173. Kay Nolan & Julie Bosman, Milwaukee Officer Is Acquitted in Killing of 
Sylville Smith, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/ 
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The inherent challenges of the Stockley case for the prosecution 
are exacerbated by the everyday decisions of prosecutors in cases that 
involve routine complicity with police perjury.174 The failure of 
prosecutors to challenge police narratives leaves intact unconscious 
tropes linking blackness with criminality, which ultimately take on a 
life of their own, embedding in the minds of fact finders and making 
the prosecution of police nearly impossible.175  
III. MORE RESTORATIVE PROSECUTION PRACTICES COULD 
DECREASE RELIANCE ON POLICE TESTIMONY, INCREASE DIVERSITY 
OF NARRATIVES IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE, AND IMPROVE 
PROSECUTION OF OFFICER MISCONDUCT 
Law Professor Seth Stoughton, a former police officer, has 
argued that law enforcement has a “Warrior” problem.176 Stoughton 
argues that shifting the policing model from the archetype of the 
Warrior to the archetype of the Guardian would necessarily change the 
behavior of police officers because it would change their objectives 
                                                   
21/us/milwaukee-police-shooting-trial-protest.html [http://perma.cc/6S3C-UA4K]. 
“I feel like no matter what it is, these police officers all over the world, they can just 
literally murder you,” said a stepsister, Shannon Daniels. Id. “I feel he blatantly shot 
Sylville. I feel it was intentional.” Id. 
 174. This case is by no means the cleanest example of these difficulties. The 
testimony of eyewitnesses and the decision to charge Stockley with first-degree 
homicide (such that prosecutors were required to prove premeditation) did not make 
this an easy or simple case for the prosecution. It is included primarily because the 
written opinion accompanying the verdict offers some insight into the fact finder’s 
reasoning. 
 175. They also leave prosecutors vulnerable to attack. When former Tulsa, 
Oklahoma, police officer Betty Shelby was on trial for shooting and killing Terence 
Crutcher, an unarmed black man, during a traffic incident, her defense attorney 
focused his closing argument on the prosecutor’s hypocrisy. See Dylan Goforth, 
Jurors Begin Deliberating as Attorneys Close in Betty Shelby Trial, FRONTIER (May 
17, 2017), https://www.readfrontier.org/stories/jury-begins-deliberating-attorneys-
close-betty-shelby-trial/ [https://perma.cc/DJ6N-VL28]. He told the jury that the 
prosecutor regularly calls officers as reliable witnesses in his other cases but 
nonetheless “has the audacity to come in here and tell you that law enforcement 
officers will come in here and lie to protect Betty Shelby.” Id. Evidence of the blue 
wall of silence indicates that was quite likely, but nonetheless the argument was 
apparently effective.  
 176. See Seth Stoughton, Law Enforcement’s Warrior Problem, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 225, 225 (2014-2015) (arguing that American police officers are trained to 
think of themselves as warriors pitted against an enemy, and that this worldview 
contributes to a high number of negative interactions between officers and civilians—
particularly civilians of color). 
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when interacting with citizens.177 Perhaps the same fundamental shift 
is needed for prosecutors. American prosecutors embody a nearly 
impossible role in the justice system. They are required to seek justice 
for all parties while also making up one side of an adversarial 
system.178 Prosecutors understandably become attached to their 
complainants and cases and, particularly in high-stakes felony trials, 
to obtaining convictions. This creates what could be called an 
“Adversary” problem.179 Like the Warrior, the Adversary is a 
problematic archetype for the American prosecutor, as is the archetype 
commonly associated with high-volume misdemeanor practice—the 
“Case-Processor.”180  
Fortunately for prosecutors, the American Bar Association 
(ABA) has identified a potential alternative model to replace these 
paradigms. The ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution 
Function states that “[t]he prosecutor is not merely a case-processor 
but also a problem-solver responsible for considering broad goals of 
the criminal justice system.”181 A Problem-Solver mentality 
necessarily takes a more holistic approach to criminal justice, looking 
for true solutions to both the problems created by an offense and the 
                                                   
 177. See id. at 226. 
 178. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-
1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
 179. See Levine, supra note 10, at 758 (indicating that line prosecutors are 
often promoted due to their success at obtaining convictions, and district attorneys run 
for reelection on their “tough on crime” stance).  
 180. See § 3-1.2; Natapoff, supra note 17, at 257. It should also be noted that 
the vastly different funding applied toward prosecution offices versus indigent 
defense offices make the “Adversary” role particularly difficult to justify. See PFAFF, 
supra note 146 (noting that some states paid three times as much for prosecution as 
toward the state indigent defense funding). There will still be a place for prosecutors 
to act as the Adversary in the criminal system. The bulk of this Article has been 
devoted to the times when such a role is required by the state and the public—
specifically, crimes of violence where the alleged perpetrator denies wrongdoing. The 
importance of this role is heightened where the victim is a member of a marginalized, 
oppressed, or vulnerable group. Similarly, Stoughton is careful to note that the 
Warrior mentality does have a role in policing, specifically when officers are put in 
that position to protect themselves or, more importantly, others. See Stoughton, supra 
note 167, at 225. 
 181. § 3-1.2(f). This is similar to the language Howard Zehr uses in detailing 
a restorative approach to justice: “[L]awyers (including prosecutors) would envision 
themselves less as gladiators out to win than as healers and problem-solvers.” ZEHR, 
supra note 17, at 77. 
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problems underlying it.182 In other words, it embraces some of the 
fundamental principles of restorative justice.183  
Prosecutors can embody the Problem-Solver archetype by using 
restorative practices to drive decision-making. In order to support 
these efforts, voters should elect candidates for District Attorney who 
support restorative practices and will instill in their offices a less 
adversarial approach to justice. The electorate has already started 
electing some District Attorneys who are making drastic changes to 
their offices, including the institution of more restorative-based 
decision-making.184 Law schools should support these efforts by 
increasing clinic offerings in prosecution to give burgeoning 
prosecutors an opportunity to engage in best practices thoughtfully 
and diligently outside of the Case-Processor approach that defines the 
work of most young prosecutors.  
A. Shifting to Restorative-Driven Decision-Making Would 
Encourage Prosecutors to Act as Problem-Solvers as Opposed to 
Adversaries 
Decreasing prosecutor complicity with police perjury and pro-
police narratives requires decreasing the dependency of prosecutors 
on police officers as witnesses.185 Although much of this Article has 
addressed the strengths of and need for formal retributive justice in the 
case of police shootings, this Section explores a proposal that may 
seem counterintuitive: that one way to increase the success of police 
prosecutions is to use more restorative justice practices in the 
retributive criminal system.186 Currently, the primary framework for 
prosecutorial decision-making is retributive, as the primary questions 
prosecutors use as a guide are those that define a retributive system: 
                                                   
 182. See § 3-1.2(f). 
 183. See ZEHR, supra note 17, at 22-25. 
 184. See Gonnerman, supra note 98. 
 185. See supra Part II. 
 186. FORMAN, supra note 161, at 236-37 (“What if we came to see that justice 
requires accountability, but not vengeance?” . . . What if we endeavored to make the 
lives of black victims matter without policies that lead to the mass incarceration of 
black defendants? What if we strove for compassion, for mercy, for forgiveness? And 
what if we did this for everybody, including people who have harmed others?” 
Forman provides a litany of reform proposals to make the criminal system more 
compassionate and restorative). Howard Zehr, who aspires to a system where 
restorative practices are the norm and the legal or criminal justice system serves as an 
alternative to be drawn on when needed, also proposes the shift to a more restorative 
criminal justice system. See ZEHR, supra note 17, at 63.  
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“What laws have been broken? Who did it? What do they deserve?”187 
This line of inquiry essentially looks at the offender’s conduct in a 
vacuum and leaves little room to consider gravity of harm, normative 
innocence,188 or concerns of disparate enforcement.189 It asks 
prosecutors—and by extension, police—to focus on crimes with no 
identifiable harm, thereby increasing the likelihood of unnecessary 
police interactions with citizens and a heavy reliance on police 
narratives in court.190 Prosecuting these victimless “public order” 
offenses diverts time and resources away from more serious 
misdemeanors and results in extraordinarily high numbers of 
convictions, despite a lack of demonstrable harm.191 
A recent example of the type of case the retributive framework 
generates: An African–American man, Johnny Rush, was stopped by 
officers in Asheville, North Carolina for jaywalking across an empty 
street.192 After he attempted to walk away from the officers, he was 
chased, beaten, and repeatedly tased.193 Viewing the video of the 
incident causes a reasonable person to ask why two uniformed officers 
would bother stopping a man for crossing an empty street, as it is 
unclear what social harm they were trying to address. Yet, the 
                                                   
 187. See ZEHR, supra note 17, at 63. 
 188. See Bowers, supra note 146, at 1678 (defining normative innocence as 
“conduct . . . undeserving of communal condemnation, even if it is contrary to law”).  
 189. K. Babe Howell has proposed that prosecutors should decline to 
prosecute low-level misdemeanor offenses where there is concern of racial disparity, 
based on their duties arising out of the ABA Standards and Prosecutor Professional 
Conduct. See Howell, supra note 148, at 287.  
 190. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1318 
(describing the massive problem of the oversized misdemeanor system and its high 
potential for wrongful convictions as being most acute in the context of “high-volume 
arrest policies such as urban drug sweeps and zero-tolerance policing in which police 
are simultaneously enforcers and primary sources of evidence.”).  
 191. See id, at 1321 (noting that in some jurisdictions as many as 40% of the 
petty offense or misdemeanor cases in the system may be driving with a suspended 
license charges); See also Howell, supra note 148, at 295. For example, in the state of 
Ohio, the following offenses are or can be misdemeanors: assault, OHIO REV. CODE § 
2903.13 (2013), menacing by stalking, § 2903.211, sexual imposition, § 2907.06, riot, 
§ 2917.03, and domestic violence, § 2919.25. Yet the same prosecutors responsible 
for pursuing justice in those cases may also be spending time on charges such as 
driving under suspension, § 4510.11, and failure to comply with the order or signal of 
a police officer, § 2921.331, as well as a plethora of even less serious traffic offenses. 
 192. See Meagan Flynn, ‘I Can’t Breathe’: Asheville Police Video Shows 
White Officer Beating and Choking Black Jaywalking Suspect, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/04/03/i-cant-
breathe-asheville-police-video-shows-white-officer-beating-choking-black-
jaywalking-suspect/?utm_term=.14e19a1d2326 [http://perma.cc/TKZ9-YA6D].  
 193. Id.  
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retributive system does not ask those questions. It asks only whether 
jaywalking is a crime.194 There were no witnesses to this incident other 
than the officers and Rush. Were it not for the presence of body-worn 
cameras, a trial would have pitted the officers’ word against Rush’s—
precisely the kind of police-credibility trial described in Part II, in 
which the prosecutor would have to rely heavily, if not exclusively, on 
the credibility of the officer’s narrative. 
Scholars have proposed numerous ways and reasons to focus 
prosecutorial attention away from minor offenses.195 This proposal 
differs slightly by proposing that prosecutors specifically use 
restorative justice as the framework to guide their decision-making. 
Unlike retributive justice, restorative justice defines a crime by the 
created harm.196 Restorative practitioners ask: “Who has been hurt? 
What do they need? Whose obligations and responsibilities are these? 
What causes contributed to this?”197 This method requires that the 
decision-maker consider more than just the apportionment of blame. 
In so doing, it resists the dehumanization that exists throughout much 
of the criminal system and its history, ultimately making it harder to 
weaponize against vulnerable populations than the retributive system 
has proven to be.198 “Restorative justice asks stakeholders to look at 
crime through a fundamentally different lens. . . . This shift requires 
not only the reimagining of roles (and the norms for behavior 
associated with those roles) but also the reordering of priorities and 
restructuring of power.”199 If prosecutors took a more restorative-
based approach to criminal justice, they would necessarily focus more 
                                                   
 194. See Matt Apuzzo & John Eligon, Department of Justice Reaches 
Agreement with Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/01/28/us/department-of-justice-reaches-agreement-with-ferguson.html 
[http://perma.cc/DLE5-3YY8] Part of the Ferguson Consent Decree was a repeal of 
the jaywalking ordinance, after it was made clear to the city that 95% of people 
arrested for jaywalking were African American, and that in the rare instance when the 
person arrested and charged with a similarly low-level offense was white, the chances 
of the case being dismissed were 68% higher. Id.  
 195. See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 153, at 1709; Howell, supra note 148; 
Natapoff, supra note 17, at 256.  
 196. Patrick Gerkin et al., Implementing Restorative Justice Under the 
Retributive Paradigm: A Pilot Program Case Study, SAGE OPEN 1 (2017), 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2158244017691562 
[https://perma.cc/2685-5L92] (“The process begins with the realization that crime 
signifies injury.”). 
 197. See ZEHR, supra note 17, at 21. 
 198. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 71.  
 199. See Gerkin et al., supra note 196, at 8.  
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on cases involving victims.200 This could decrease prosecutor 
complicity in police testilying by reducing the number of cases in 
which prosecutors rely exclusively on police testimony. By moving 
away from the use of common policing narratives, prosecutors could 
begin to lessen the ways in which the criminal system has discredited 
the narratives of marginalized communities. This may ultimately help 
those previously discredited narratives become more readily accepted 
in cases involving allegations of police violence. 
Another reason to focus reform efforts here is that this change 
can be made immediately, without any major changes in the law. 
Incorporating restorative principles into the formal criminal justice 
system is not a new idea, nor is it outside the existing authority of 
prosecutor offices.201 The American prosecutor today has the power to 
shift the decision-making framework of the criminal system from 
retributive to restorative without a single legislative act.202 He or she 
has the authority to exercise discretion in declining to pursue criminal 
charges,203 to develop alternatives to prosecution or conviction in 
individual or classes of cases,204 and to effect remedial action where 
inadequacies or injustices exist in the criminal system.205 Prosecutors 
right now have the ability to decline to pursue certain low-level crimes 
for any number of reasons, and many do.206 Finally, reform must 
include changes in the culture of prosecution because the power, 
                                                   
 200. This is because the foundational question “Who has been harmed?” 
focuses on victims first, not perpetrators. 
 201. See Gerkin et al., supra note 196, at 8 (citing GERRY JOHNSTONE, 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: IDEAS, VALUES, DEBATES (2d. ed., 2011)). 
 202. See John F. Pfaff, Prosecutorial Guidelines, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 101, 104 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) (explaining 
that the power and discretion of the American prosecutor is difficult to overstate). 
Moreover, the ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function include 
in the standard regarding discretion in filing, declining, maintaining, and dismissing 
criminal charges; various restorative factors such as the extent or absence of harm, 
disproportionate collateral consequences, disparate treatment of other individuals; and 
the potential influence of any cultural, ethnic, socioeconomic, or other improper 
biases. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).  
 203. See § 3-1.2(b). 
 204. See § 3-1.2(e). 
 205. See § 3-1.2(d). 
 206. See Natapoff, supra note 17, at 258; see also Gonnerman, supra note 98 
(noting that Rachael Rollins, a former federal prosecutor, ran and won the race for 
District Attorney on a platform promising to stop prosecuting drug possession, 
shoplifting, and other crimes, indicating that the cases that were not dismissed would 
be dealt with through community service, educational programs, or other means). 
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discretion, and authority of prosecutors is so great that criminal justice 
reform realistically cannot take place without their involvement.207  
B. Electing Progressive Prosecutors Should Include Electing 
Prosecutors Committed to Restorative Justice  
While cultural changes can have a profound impact on office 
practices as well as the system as a whole,208 they require buy-in from 
top prosecutors.209 As more District Attorneys are elected on 
progressive platforms to decrease mass incarceration and reduce the 
disproportionate impact of the criminal system on poor people of 
color, more and more prosecution offices are undergoing major 
                                                   
 207. Juleyka Lantigua-Williams, Are Prosecutors the Key to Justice Reform? 
Given Their Autonomy—Only If They Want to Be, ATLANTIC (May 18, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/are-prosecutors-the-key-to-
justice-reform/483252/ [http://perma.cc/FT28-9SE2] (“An Urban Institute 
report analyzed South Dakota’s criminal-justice reforms and found that when certain 
low-level crimes were no longer eligible for lengthy sentences, prosecutions against 
crimes that were eligible for such sentences shot up. ‘They noticed that DAs actually 
started increasing their charging in an effort to get around reform,[‘] Pfaff said. He 
said that if states make it difficult to charge offenders with one type of crime, DAs 
will choose another option and use it widely. Sometimes, that results in even tougher 
sentences than the DAs might have originally sought. [‘]There is some evidence that 
DAs will, in the presence of reform laws, try to figure out ways[‘] around those 
reforms, Pfaff said. [‘]They often have the ability to find ways to circumvent efforts 
at reform if they really want to.’”) (quoting John Pfaff). 
 208. See JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS 
INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017) (“[I]t’s worth noting 
not just how local the changes were, but how non-legal they were. The decline in drug 
incarcerations wasn’t driven by the changes in the law, but by some combination of 
changing local crime rates and changing views of the local police and prosecutors 
about who to arrest and how harshly to charge them. It was more an attitudinal change, 
not a legal one.”). 
 209. See id.; 3 REFORMING CRIM. JUST.: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 1, 
103 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) To address the lack of buy-in, John Pfaff has suggested 
creating a set of guidelines for prosecutors that would govern discretionary decisions 
of charging, diversion, and plea-bargaining. Such guidelines are not a perfect solution 
but are one way to promote accuracy and consistency in decision-making and target 
issues such as implicit bias. See id. at 115. Perhaps the most insightful argument Pfaff 
makes is for asymmetry in the guidelines—making them binding when requiring 
leniency but only presumptive when imposing severity. See id. at 117. This could limit 
overcharging and the harsh retributive practices of “law and order” prosecutors who 
continue to hold a “tough on crime” mentality. See id. Perhaps more importantly, 
making the guidelines binding when imposing leniency creates the ability for 
prosecutors to pursue restorative resolutions to cases without fear of public reproach 
for being “soft on crime.” 
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cultural shifts.210 Newly elected progressive prosecutors have taken 
various steps to address the culture of prosecution upon taking office. 
Some have fired higher-level assistant prosecutors and replaced them 
with more like-minded attorneys or with newer attorneys less likely to 
resist progressive approaches.211 Many seek to create or strengthen 
their Conviction Integrity or Conviction Review Units to investigate 
claims of police or prosecutorial wrongdoing during the charging or 
trial process.212 Others move to eliminate cash bail to ensure fairness 
and reduce the concern that guilty pleas are predicated on an inability 
to make bail.213 Some have immediately ceased prosecuting certain 
offenses or promulgated policies for how to treat certain types of 
crimes.214 Some have made changes to their training practices, 
including hiring outside organizations such as Adam Foss’s 
Prosecutor Impact to ensure that new prosecutors have an 
understanding of the lives of the people they are prosecuting as well 
as how issues of race, poverty, addiction, and mental illness intersect 
with the criminal system. 215 
                                                   
 210. See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, The Changing Political Landscape for 
Elected Prosecutors, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 647, 647, 667 (2017); see also Matt 
Ferner, Progressive Prosecutors Win Primaries in North Carolina, HUFFINGTON POST 
(May 8, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/north-carolina-progressive- 
prosecutors_us_5af22ea3e4b0aab8a78a067e?ncid=engmodushpmg00000004 
[http://perma.cc/EX8H-UVH3]; Ben Austen, In Philadelphia, a Progressive D.A. 
Tests the Power—and Learns the Limits—of His Office, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 30, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/30/magazine/larry-krasner-philadelphia-
district-attorney-progressive.html [http://perma.cc/Y8AJ-ZVE3] (“[B]eginning in 
2013, when the late Ken Thompson unseated a 23-year incumbent in Brooklyn, voters 
have elected 30 reform-minded prosecutors, in municipalities as varied as Corpus 
Christi, Kansas City and San Francisco.”); Gonnerman, supra note 98. 
 211. See Gonnerman, supra note 98. 
 212. See id. 
 213. See id. 
 214. Shaun King, Philadelphia DA Larry Krasner Promised a Criminal 
Justice Revolution. He’s Exceeding Expectations, INTERCEPT (Mar. 20, 2018, 3:59 
PM), https://theintercept.com/2018/03/20/larry-krasner-philadelphia-da/ 
 [http://perma.cc/8TQ3-9QYB] (discussing a five-page memorandum issued by 
Krasner shortly after taking office mandating that all line prosecutors decline charges 
of marijuana possession and prostitution).  
 215. See Matt Watkins, Prosecutor Power #5, Adam Foss: Use Your Power 
Well, CTR. CT. INNOVATION, https://www.courtinnovation.org/publications/adam-
foss-podcast [https://perma.cc/6Q28-X68M] (last visited Mar. 4, 2019).  
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C. Training and Educating Progressive Prosecutors Can Support This 
Paradigmatic Shift 
To bring about such a paradigmatic shift, the way that law 
schools train and educate future prosecutors also needs to change. 
Most American law schools have defense clinics that allow students 
to practice as certified legal interns under the supervision of a clinical 
professor, usually representing indigent clients who would otherwise 
be represented by a public defender. These clinical experiences are 
invaluable for shaping new lawyers; they offer opportunities for law 
students to develop their understanding of lawyering and client 
representation, to begin to create their professional persona and sense 
of ethics, and to expose and critique the systems of power that target 
marginalized communities through criminal prosecution.  
There are, comparatively speaking, relatively few similarly 
situated prosecution clinics.216 Instead, law students typically intern at 
a prosecutor’s office under the supervision of a staff attorney. While 
this can be a tremendous opportunity for law students, it is not a 
comparable experience to a full criminal prosecution clinic. Staff 
attorney caseloads do not permit the type of hands-on supervision and 
in-depth feedback on student lawyering that a clinical professor is 
expected to provide. Externships at law schools may have a class 
seminar component but are typically not segregated by subject matter. 
This means that students in externship seminars cannot typically 
engage in case rounds—the seminal pedagogy of law clinics—due to 
confidentiality concerns. Case rounds give students the opportunity to 
seek advice from their classmates and professors on everything from 
                                                   
 216. As of 2018, out of 203 ABA-approved law schools, thirty-six have 
prosecution clinics, but only nineteen appear to have an “in-house” clinic, as opposed 
to an externship agreement with a District Attorney Office supplemented by a seminar 
class. In contrast, 107 law schools have some form of a defense clinic (fourteen of 
those are “specialty” clinics focused on appeals, wrongful convictions, juvenile 
defense and death penalty work). Seventy-eight law schools have an “in-house” 
defense clinic, and approximately fifteen have an agreement with a criminal defense 
organization or public defender office offering an externship and associated seminar 
class. Information is on file with the author and available upon request. Note that there 
is an argument to be made, raised by the author’s excellent research assistant Matthew 
Finston, that most law schools frame their clinic programs as services provided to the 
indigent community in order to increase access to justice, and perhaps prosecution 
clinics do not fit this model. But they should. Indigent communities are not only vastly 
overrepresented as defendants in the criminal system, but they are also vastly 
underrepresented as victims. A restorative-based, problem-solving approach to 
prosecution could aid law schools in achieving their mission to increase access to 
justice.  
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the constitutionality of a search to the disclosure of discovery to trial 
theory, as well as to discuss their fears, beliefs, and concerns. Without 
a dedicated criminal justice curriculum, students may lack the 
opportunity to reflect on larger systemic issues of mass incarceration, 
the history of criminal jurisprudence, racial disparities in the criminal 
system, and prosecutorial ethics.217 These are conversations that law 
students are interested in having, yet they may not be the types of 
conversations that first or second-year prosecutors are able to engage 
in when they are trying to keep up with heavy caseloads and learning 
to navigate an entirely new world of judges, complainants, police 
officers, and supervisors.  
Moreover, internships at District Attorney offices may 
unintentionally replicate some of the problems in the criminal system. 
Line prosecutors—particularly in misdemeanor court—have 
overburdened caseloads. They rarely have the time to conduct 
investigations, meaningfully vet witnesses, or work with community 
resources to find resolutions to cases that both restore victims and 
equip defendants not to recidivate. Defense attorneys approaching 
prosecutors at initial court hearings often find an attorney who has not 
had time to open the file, much less look into issues like Fourth 
Amendment violations, witness bias, or defendant mitigation, all of 
which should play a part in case disposition. Prosecutors in 
misdemeanor court, where most interns are assigned, are also heavily 
reliant on police officer narratives to make out their cases and often 
lack the institutional clout to challenge such narratives when they 
appear suspect. Student interns without a dedicated instructor are 
learning from these prosecutors and may be assuming that they are 
seeing best practices rather than triage. 
A clinical setting can address some of this. Clinical students are 
typically assigned far fewer cases than first and second-year 
prosecutors or interns. This gives them the opportunity to investigate 
the police report for any potential Fourth Amendment violations or 
evidentiary problems. It affords them the time to speak and meet with 
potential witnesses to reveal any biases that may be informing their 
testimony, weaknesses that could undermine a trial, or—in the case of 
complainants—specific desired outcomes that could inform plea 
negotiations.218 It gives them the time and opportunity to build 
                                                   
 217. This is not to mention experiential learning opportunities such as jail 
tours, police ride-alongs, and guest lectures by practitioners and local experts. 
 218. Consider, for example, the complainant who wants only restitution for a 
theft or criminal damaging, and who has no interest in saddling the defendant with a 
criminal charge. 
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meaningful relationships with complainants, allowing them to create 
solutions that take complainants’ stated needs into account, as well as 
to ensure they are heard and respected by the system. This can lead to 
more effective and just resolutions earlier in the life of a case—saving 
the system, the defendant, and the complainant or witness time, 
money, and hardship. Finally, law school clinics may have fewer 
institutional concerns when it comes to maintaining police 
relationships because handling fewer cases makes them less reliant on 
those relationships. This may allow law students in a clinic to feel 
more able to withdraw charges where they believe police have violated 
the defendant’s constitutional rights or to investigate more thoroughly 
police stories that invoke troublesome narratives. 
One concern that may be raised in response is that law students 
who do eventually become prosecutors will not be practicing under 
these conditions. That should not be dissuasive. After all, defense 
clinic students handle relatively few cases over the course of the 
semester compared to the massive caseloads of public defenders. 
Having the opportunity to learn under the best possible conditions first 
is valuable. The purpose of a law school clinic is not to replicate the 
hardships of practicing in the real world. It is to provide students with 
as solid a foundation as possible upon which to build their skills, 
allowing them to approach their work with insight, empathy, and an 
understanding of how each individual case fits into the larger criminal 
system. The goal of the clinic is to ensure that students learn skills that 
they will continue to draw upon throughout their careers, even under 
the more adverse practice conditions they will face in the real, and 
troubled, world.219 Increasing the offerings of law school prosecution 
clinics to teach restorative-based decision-making practices may 
therefore be a part of the solution. 
In order to facilitate a shift from an Adversary or Case-Processor 
framework of prosecution to a Problem-Solver framework, 
                                                   
 219. One can also hope that increasing the offerings of prosecution clinics in 
law schools could attract a more diverse set of new lawyers to prosecution. As of 
2014, 95% of elected prosecutors in the United States were white, and 83% were men. 
Amita Kelly, Does It Matter That 95% of Elected Prosecutors Are White? NPR, 
https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/07/08/420913118/does-it- 
matter-that-95-of-elected-prosecutors-are-white [http://perma.cc/7SQ3-78RH] 
(citing a report by the Reflective Democracy Campaign). Increasing the diversity of 
prosecutors could help to increase the cultural humility of prosecution offices and 
mitigate some of the implicit biases exhibited in discretionary decisions. CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-2.3(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2015). (“[S]pecial effort should be made to recruit women and minority 
prosecutors.”). 
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prosecution offices should embrace restorative-driven decision-
making within the retributive American criminal system. By 
supporting and electing progressive prosecutors whose campaigns 
include a commitment to restorative practices, voters can shift the 
needle from a solely retributive “law and order” approach to 
prosecution to a more restorative one. This may in turn reduce 
prosecutor dependency on police officers and allow for a more robust 
policing of the police. Law schools should create more offerings 
specifically for prosecution-minded law students that allow them to 
engage in restorative-based practices in a clinical setting. Progressive 
prosecution offices should continue this work by teaching these values 
in initial trainings like those run by Prosecutor Impact220 and by 
reinforcing these values through office culture by establishing robust 
Conviction Integrity Units and Restorative Justice Units and using 
means other than conviction rates to measure prosecutor success.221 
CONCLUSION 
Accountability through criminal charges is fundamental to the 
rule of law.222 Persistent acquittals of officers like Jason Stockley and 
Betty Shelby undermine citizens’ belief in the rule of law223 because 
they lay bare what many see as a double standard in the treatment of 
police defendants versus defendants of color.224 More robust 
prosecutions of police are necessary in order to hold individuals 
accountable and send the message to society that systemic police 
violence against people of color is unacceptable. This message is 
necessary to address the culture of impunity that has surrounded 
                                                   
 220. See generally, e.g., PROSECUTOR IMPACT, https://prosecutorimpact.com/ 
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racially motivated police violence for centuries. Prosecutors currently 
face an uphill battle seeking convictions against police officers due to 
their long-standing dependency on police as witnesses and their 
routine complicity with officers falsifying testimony. Decreasing 
reliance on officer narratives by moving away from a purely 
retributive approach to criminal justice in favor of more restorative-
based practices could alleviate some of these challenges.  
This shift to more restorative decision-making can be brought 
about through top-down cultural changes in prosecution offices, as 
well as through greater investment in training and educating future 
prosecutors while in law school. Shifting to a restorative-based 
practice will not scrub implicit bias from the criminal system, nor 
directly address the racial profiling and disproportionate policing that 
goes on in low-income neighborhoods of color. As argued in Part II, 
the criminal system—with its focus on individual cases and individual 
harm—is ill-equipped to unearth and combat these larger systemic 
issues. However, effectively holding police officers accountable for 
crimes committed—particularly those against individuals of color—is 
a necessary predicate for concurrent restorative practices in the 
informal justice system to surface and confront larger systemic and 
historical truths.225  
Given the increasingly divisive and hateful rhetoric that has 
characterized much of American life for the past few years, there will 
no doubt be a time in the near future when Americans will need 
reconciliation. But reconciliation cannot take place while injustices 
sought to be addressed are ongoing. In order to create a foundation 
upon which reconciliation can take place, perpetrators—particularly 
those acting under the authority of the State—must be held 
accountable for their actions. Prosecutors, who have been called “the 
gatekeeper of America’s justice system,”226 have a large and difficult 
role to play in that process. The proposal laid out in this Article works 
in concert with numerous other proposals as a way to begin. 
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